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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a 
corporation, and AETNA 
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 17621 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen for 
damages against the Defendant John Clay and Company for the 
willful, malicious and outrageous breach of contract by said 
Defendant. Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company is the 
surety for Defendant John Clay and Company pursuant to a bond 
required by the Packers and Stockyards Act administered by the 
Department of Agriculture, and is thereby liable to the extent 
of its bond ($75,000). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 30, 1980, following a lengthy jury trial before the 
Honorable Don v. Tibbs, District Judge, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant for 
general damages of $191,463.40 and one dollar punitive 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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damages. (Verdict, R. 130) The jury also found in the 
Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant .John Clay on its 
Counterclaim. (R. 131) The Judgment on the Verdict was 
entered by the trial court on July 8, 1980, for $191,464.40, 
"together with interest on all of said Judgment as shall 
hereafter be determined by the Court." The Judgment further 
provided that "Pursuant to the Pretrial Order, the amount of 
interest, if any, and whether Plaintiff is entitled to 
attorneys' fees and, if so, the amount thereof are reserved for I 
future determination by the Court." (Judgment, R. 136-37, 
Appendix A, attached hereto) 
On November 7, 1980, Defendants' appeal to this Court was 
dismissed, sua sponte, because it was not an appeal from a 
final judgment. The matter was remitted to the trial court for 
the determination of the questions of interest and attorneys' 
fees. (Remittitur, R. 154) 
Following consideration of lengthy memoranda, oral 
arguments of counsel and the Defendants' objections, the trial 
court awarded Plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee and 
interest. The Court entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, finding that "the conduct of the Defendant 
John Clay and Company and its officers and employees was 
willful, malicious and oppressive as found by the jury." 
(Amended Findings, R. 216-18, Appendix B, attached hereto) 
· · an Amended Supplemental Judgment Pursuant to its Findings, 
was entered on February 24, 1981, awarding Plaintiff' in 
-2-
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addition to the jury's verdict, the sum of $21,400.00 as a 
~easonable attorneys' fee. The Plaintiff was also awarded 
prejudgment interest at six percent per annum, totaling 
$14,822.37; and interest after the Judgment on the Verdict at 
eight percent, totaling $9,087.21. (Amended Supplemental 
.Judgment, R. 214-15, attached as Appendix C) Defen<lants then 
appealed to this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance in their entirety of 
the jury's verdict, the Judgment entered thereon and the 
Amended Supplemental Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent refers to the trial record as follows: 
Trial transcript as "Tr.--;" 
Court file as "R.--;" 
Trial exhibits as "Exh.--." 
While Appellants' Statement of Facts is generally accurate, 
it is incomplete and omits substantial evidence, presumably in 
order to avoid the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence 
supporting the judgment against Appellants. Appellants also 
state as "fact" testimony favorable only to their contentions 
~n appeal. Therefore, Respondent provides the following 
comprehensive Statement of Facts: 
The Parties 
Plaintiff-Respondent Neil Jorgensen is a sheep 
rancher-farmer residing in Mount Pleasant, Sanpete County, 
-3-
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Utah. He has been in the sheep business under the name of the 
Skyline Sheep Company for 25 years, having raised and sold 
lambs for over ten years. In the fall of 1978, Mr. Jorgensen 
had purchased and/or raised 18,000 lambs to be marketed. ('1'r. 
49-51, 54) 
Defendant-Appellant .John Clay and Company (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "John Clay" or "Defendant") is a 
closely-held Utah corporation doing business as a livestock 
dealer. While it has an office in Ogden, Weber County, Utah, 
it conducts its business of buying and selling sheep and other 
livestock throughout the western states. (Tr. 697) As 
particularly described herein, virtually all of the 
transactions in the instant dispute occurred in Arizona, 
California, Colorado or Sanpete County, Utah. (Tr. 70, 
100-106, 293, 297, 311, 323, 328, 694-95) 
John Clay purchases and markets approximately one-half 
million lambs each year to the major meat packing houses. Irr. 
342, 697-98, 726) It estimates an average profit of sixty 
cents for each lamb it markets. (Tr. 342-43) In 1979, it sold 
250,000 lambs (valued at over $16,000,000.00) to Monfort 
Company of Colorado, a processor with plants in Colorado and 
Texas. (Tr. 696) Officers and stockholders of John Clay are 
Raymond (Rink) Williams and Frank Rynders. (Tr. 694-95) Leon 
Sparrow is a sheep "salesman and buyer" for the company under 
Williams' direction. During the marketing season, Sparrow 
lives in and works out of Yuma, Arizona. (Tr. 78, 28S, 
323
' 
704; Exh. 12A) Williams resides in Phoenix, Arizona. 
(Tr, 694' 
-4-
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In the sheep industry, lambs born in the preceding winter 
or spring are fed on summer range. Mr. Jorgensen's lambs which 
are not ready for market in the fall are sent to pastures or 
feedlots near Blythe, California, or ~rizona. These lambs are 
called "feeder lambs." Later, when they become "fat" and are 
ready for market, they are generally termed "old crop lambs." 
(Tr. 52-55) The fat lambs are sold by Mr. Jorgensen either to 
a middleman livestock dealer such as John Clay and Company or 
directly to the packing house. (Tr. 51-55) The price of the 
lambs is determined by their weight and time of delivery. The 
price of the lambs may be discounted by a "weight stop" when a 
buyer does not want to pay for weight above a certain minimum 
(e.g., 120 pounds). Such practice is disapproved by the 
Packers and Stockyards Administration as an unfair trade 
practice. (Tr. 557-58, 686-68; App. E, PP• 4-5) 
The Contract 
In December, 1978, Leon Sparrow, Defendant's lamb buyer, 
contacted the Plaintiff in Mount Pleasant to see if the latter 
would sell another 10,000 lambs to John Clay and Company. ITr. 
63-64) Sparrow had already come to Jorgensen in Mount Pleasant 
the previous month and entered into a written contract with 
Plaintiff to purchase 5,000 of Plaintiff's lambs at 65c per 
pound with a "120-pound weight stop." (Tr. 60, 298, 345-47, 
685-88; Exh. 16) sparrow had already arranged to sell these 
lambs to Monfort for 65.50C per pound. (Tr. 348) At this time 
most of Plaintiff's 18,000 lambs were on feed in Blythe, 
-5-
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California, with some loads in Cedar City and Mount Pleasant, 
Utah. (Tr. 65, 292) 
' On December 13, 1978, in Mount Pleasant, Plaintiff receive: i 
from Sparrow and signed a contract to sell to John Clay 10 ,ooo 
"old crop lambs" at 70¢ per pound with no weight stop. (Exh. 
l; R. 24) The contract, prepared by Sparrow, states in part: I 
The lambs are on pasture in Blythe, California Area. They 
are to be sorted at Daylight the morning of Del., loaded oi 
trucks & weighed on the trucks at nearest scale. delivery ' 
to be F.O.B. truck. 
Balance of Purchase Price shall be paid when livestock are 
loaded on cars. 
(Exh. 1, Appendix D, attached hereto) 
As an "amendment" to the 5,000 head (65e) contract, a 
further clause was inserted that "4 loads to go after X-mas 
from Cedar City." (Appendix D; Tr. 65, 69, 348-49) 
Thereafter, Sparrow contacted Ray Wadlington, lamb buyer 
for Monfort of Colorado. Sparrow arranged to sell the lambs to 
Monfort at a price one-half cent per pound greater than the 
price in John Clay's contract with Jorgensen. (Exhs. 17, 18) 
After Christmas, 1978, shipments from Blythe (and Cedar 
City) began on the 65¢ contract directly to Monfort's 
processing plant in Greeley, Colorado. (Tr. 69) Deliveries 
from Blythe continued into January, 1979, until the 6Sc 
contract was completed. (Tr. 139; Exh. 14) Plaintiff also 
orally agreed to sell other lambs to John Clay at 73c per pound 
with no weight stop. ( 1 36 140 163) On the occasion of Tr. , , 
each shipment, shipping dates were discussed and agreed upon in 
that Plal. nt1' ff could either be advance of each shipment so 
-6-
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present or have a representative present to supervise the 
sorting, loading and inspection of the lambs. (Tr. 69, 137) 
John Clay worked very closely with Monfort because it is a 
major buyer of livestock from John Clay. (Tr. 696) Lambs sold 
by the Defendant to Monfort were shipped both to Greeley, 
Colorado, and San Angelo, Texas. (R. 634-35) Leon Sparrow and 
Rink Williams (John Clay's representatives) knew Wadlington and 
Robert Quam (Monfort's head lamb buyers) and dealt with them on 
a daily basis. Sparrow was always in close daily contact with 
Wadlington and other Monfort personnel, arranging shipping 
dates and settling payment on other lambs, as well as Neil 
Jorgnesen's. (Tr. 393, 342-44, 600, 615, 622, 655-56, 704) 
About December 30, 1978, the Plaintiff informed Leon 
Sparrow that because of weather conditions in Blythe, 
California, the lambs to be shipped under the 10,000 head 706 
contract needed to be moved to get better feed. The parties 
discussed the weather condition in Blythe. (Tr. 70-71) 
Sparrow called Plaintiff and suggested that he move the 10,000 
head to the Marvin Weber feedlot in Ault, Colorado, eleven 
miles from Monfort's plant at Greeley. (Tr. 71) Sparrow 
agreed that John Clay would reimburse Plaintiff for the freight 
to Colorado since Clay was already obligated to pay for 
shipment of the fat lambs from Blythe under the terms of the 
written contract. (Tr. 72-74, 352) Sparrow also made the 
arrangements with the feedlot, through Wadlington at Monfort, 
where the lambs would be cared for and fed at Plaintiff's 
-7-
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expense until such time as proper delivery was to be made und,, 
the contract. (Tr. 74, 352, 585-86) No change was made in th, 
delivery dates. John Clay still had the option to take 
delivery of the lambs between January and March 15, 197'l, !•r, 
352) 
Shipment of all Plaintiff's lambs from Blythe proceeded 
through .January, 1979. While Plaintiff's fat lambs were 
shipped to the Monfort packing house to fi 11 the 65c contract, 
the parties were also shipping the "feeder lambs" (which were 
not yet fat) to the Weber feedlot under the 10,000 lamb 
contract. (Tr. 76-77, 354-60) The last shipment of "feeder 
lambs" to Ault left Blythe on January 24, 1979. Proper 
shipping arrangements were observed and either Plaintiff or hi; 
representative was present for every shipment. (Tr. 74) A 
total of 9,887 lambs were received by Weber in Ault. (Exh. 19! 
During this period, Sparrow and Plaintiff were in daily 
telephone communication between Mount Pleasant, Blythe, 
California, and Yuma, Arizona. (Tr. 74, 77-78, 369-71) 
Sparrow was also in daily contact with Wadlington at Monfort. 
(Tr. 344) 
John Clay's Breach 
While in Mount Pleasant on February 10, 1979, Mr. Jorgensen 
received a phone call from Sparrow in Yuma. (Tr. 323) Sparrow 
informed Plain ti ff that on February 5, 6 and 7 Rink Williams 
and Monfort had taken 2421 of Plaintiff's lambs from the Weber 
feedlot and shipped them to the Monfort plant. (Tr. 78-811 
-8-
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Sparrow apologized for John Clay's failure to notify Plaintiff 
of the intended delivery and promised that he would make sure 
it never happened again and that Plaintiff would be notified 
before any further shipments. (Tr. 79, 143, 171, 325) 
Although in daily contact with Wadlington, Sparrow claimed that 
he had not been notified of any scheduled shipment. ITr. 344, 
371, 618) Rink Williams admitted that he had known that the 
lambs would be taken the first week of February but claimed it 
was up to Sparrow to follow through with respect to notifying 
Plaintiff of the delivery dates. (Tr. 728-31) 
Jorgensen was upset that his lambs had been taken from the 
feedlot without any notice to him. He was not acquainted with 
any of the people in Colorado and wanted to see that his lambs 
were handled properly. (Tr. 81, 171) Sparrow said that he 
didn't blame Jorgensen for being upset and repeated his promise 
that it would never happen again. (Tr. 81) Plaintiff called 
Sparrow back three or four times that day to get an 
understanding of the situation and to make sure it would not 
happen again. On each occasion Sparrow repeated his promise. 
(Tr. 80-81, 143-44) Plaintiff also requested the weight tickets 
from Sparrow for the lambs taken. (Tr. 81) Sparrow assured 
him everything had been taken care of "properly in the usual 
manner." (Tr. 83) 
The Plaintiff then called Rink Williams in Phoenix, 
Arizona, and expressed dissatisfaction with John Clay's 
business of shipping Plaintiff's lambs without notifying him. 
-9-
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Williams replied that he would do so whenever he (Williams\ so 
desired. (Tr. 81-82, 144) Plaintiff then called Sparrow 
again, who again repeated his prior promise that they would no; 
ship Plaintiff's lambs without prior notice. (Tr. 82) 
Plaintiff also called Wadlington at his home in Arizona, who 
also assured Plain ti ff that no more lambs would be taken until 
Plaintiff was notified. (Tr. 84, 619, 654-55) 
After these conversations, there was no doubt in the 
Plaintiff's mind that John Clay and Monfort had promised to 
notify Plaintiff and would so notify him before they took any 
more of his lambs. (Tr. 171) Not only was this the practice 
in all prior transactions between the parties, but advance 
notice to the seller prior to shipping is clearly the accepted 
custom and practice in the livestock industry. (Tr. 68-69, 
172-73, 190-96, 202-5, 500-1, 682) See, also, 42 FR 49929, 
September 28, 1977. 
Later, Plain ti ff received through the mail from Sparrow a 
John Clay receipt and check for the 2421 lambs taken, showing 
the number and weight of the lambs as the basis for the 
payment. However, no official weight tickets were ever sent to 
Plaintiff to verify the weight, nor was there any payment or 
accounting for the freight from Blythe to }\.ult. (Exhs. 3, 31\; 
Tr. 84-86, 182) 
The following week on February 13 and 14, Neil .Jorgensen 
went to Colorado with his wife and her parents to check on thE 
lambs. They met Wadlington at the Mon fort plant. Wadl in gt on 
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1 
I 
I 
again apologized for not having notified Plaintiff in advance 
of delivery and assured Plaintiff he would make sure he was so 
notified in the future. Nothing was said about when the next 
shipment would be. The Monfort buyer was in a hurry to catch a 
plane so he quickly excused himself. (Tr. 87-88, 230, 233, 594) 
Following his return to Sanpete County on February 14, 
Plaintiff was in contact with Sparrow in Arizona or California 
practically every day. (Tr. 88-89) In fact, Plaintiff 
continued to sell lambs to Sparrow under various oral contracts 
u late as February 27. (Tr. 160-62) But contrary to the 
promises made to him by John Clay and Monfort, .Jorgensen never 
received any notice in advance that John Clay or Monfort (or 
anyone else) wanted to take delivery of more lambs at Ault. 
(Tr. 88, 121) 
In the evening of February 22 or 23, Sparrow again called 
from Yuma to Jorgensen, informing him that ,Tohn Clay and 
Monfort had again taken lambs from the Weber feedlot in Ault. 
1Tr. 89, 328) Sparrow again apologized, stating he was 
informed by Wadlington that 695 lambs had been shipped. But 
Sparrow didn't know the weights. Plaintiff then called Marvin 
Weber at the feedlot, who informed him that 1096 lambs had been 
taken, not just 695. (Tr. 89) 
Because of confusion and uncertainty as to the number and 
weight of the sheep taken, Plaintiff had to make several calls 
to obtain the information. (Tr. 276-80, 458-66) Plaintiff 
called Sparrow back, telling him what Weber had said and 
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expressing dissatisfaction at the way Defendant's business was 
run, At Sparrow's suggestion, Plaintiff called Wadlington who 
was in California. Wadlington claimed that only 695 of 
Jorgensen's lambs were taken. He advised Plaintiff that if he 
didn't "trust anybody" to go over to Colorado himself to check 
it out. (Tr. 89-90, 630) 
Plaintiff then called the Monfort plant. The Monfort 
employee at the "lamb desk" confirmed that 1096 Jorgensen lambs 
were slaughtered; but when Plaintiff asked her for the weights 
on the lambs, she told him she had been ordered not to give 
Plain ti ff that information, Plaintiff stated to the employee 
he woula call the Packers and Stockyards Administration, if 
necessary, to get the information. (Tr. 95-96, 176-80, 261) 
Plaintiff also called Marvin Weber again, who informed him 
another shipment was scheduled for the next morning. Plaintiff 
told Weber to wait until (he) 01aintiff arrived on the first 
plane in the morning before releasing any more lambs. When it 
appeared that Plaintiff could not fly to Ault because of ba1 
weather, he called Weber and told him to go ahead and ship the 
load if necessary. Weber replied that they had already 
substituted another's lambs and there would be no problem. 
(Tr. 91, 134, 428-29, 466, 472) Although approximately 6300 of 
Plaintiff's lambs remained in Weber's feedlot, neither 
Plaintiff nor the feedlot ever received any further order or 
request from John Clay or Monfort to ship more Jorgensen 
lambs. (Tr. 121, 134, 473, 566) 
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Plaintiff again received a check from Sparrow for the 
second taking, but no official weight slips were given as 
required by law. (Exhs. 4, 4A; Tr. 92-94, 558) Plaintiff 
later learned that on each occasion John Clay and Monfort had 
obtained the weight of the sheep by loading and weighing each 
shipment contrary to the contract and the accepted custom and 
practice in the industry. (Tr. 131, 133-34, 175-176, 191-92, 
354, 609, 752-55) Furthermore, without any excuse and in 
violation of the contract and government regulation, the lambs 
had not been weighed on the "nearest public scale," even 
through a public scale was located only a block from the truck 
route to the Monfort plant. (Tr. 175, 385, 553-56, 577, 579) 
On February 27, 1979, in Blythe, California, Plaintiff and 
Leon Sparrow agreed that Plaintiff's last 274 fat lambs in 
Blythe would be delivered as part of the 70c per pound 
contract. (Tr. 97-98, 214) But Defendant failed to make any 
timely payment for them. (Tr. 369-70) Sparrow also told 
Plaintiff that they wanted to resume deliveries from Ault under 
the 10,000 lamb contract the following Monday, March 5, 1979. 
Plaintiff stated he would be there. (Tr. 99, 217) 
However, on Saturday, March 3, 1979, Sparrow called 
Jorgensen and told him that John Clay would not accept any more 
of Plaintiff's lambs because Monfort would not take them. (Tr. 
100, 391, 566) Sparrow admitted that he felt .Tohn Clay still 
had a contract with Jorgensen and was obligated to take the 
lambs. But, Sparrow said, there was nothing he could do. 
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Sparrow did not give any reason other than that Rink Williams 
had refused to take Jorgensen's lambs. (Tr. 100, 391-92) By 
this time, the market price for lambs had dropped to 60c per 
pound. (Tr. 580) 
Plaintiff and Sparrow went to Greeley, Colorado, to "su 
what might be done." (Tr. 391) In a meeting with Bob Quam, 
Monfort's head buyer, on Tuesday, March 6, 1981, Quam simply 
stated he would not take the lambs; that his deal was not with 
Jorgensen but with John Clay. (Tr. 103, 249-51) Later, 
Sparrow admitted to Plaintiff, "It looks to me like, in my 
opinion, that John Clay will have to pay you for the lambs. 
(Tr. 104, 258) 
Rink Williams and Frank Rynders arrived in Ault on 
Thursday, March 8, at Sparrow's request, and met with Sparrow 
and Plaintiff. (Tr. 103) Williams claimed the situation was 
out of Defendant's hands and wasn't its responsibility. No 
reason was given for not accepting the lambs. ( R. 255) He 
"offered" to help Plaintiff resell the lambs for considerably 
less money. (Tr. 106) T"1hen requested by Plaintiff to honor 
the contract, Williams threateningly retorted, " • if you 
plan on being in the feeding business, my advice is for you to 
take your loss now and forget it." (Tr. 254-55, 105-6) 
The following day, Williams and Rynders met privately with 
Monfort and thereafter "suggested" to Plaintiff that he accept 
their "offer" to take the lambs at 60c a pound with a 120-pound 
weight stop, provided Plaintiff released them from all 
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obligations under the contract. Although Monfort could have 
slaughtered all of Jorgensen's lambs within three days, neither 
it nor John Clay would even promise to take them promptly but 
would "clean them up by April 1, or attempt to." (Tr. 106, 
178, 546, 580) Plaintiff refused such a drastic change in the 
contract and left to return to Sanpete County, Utah. (Tr. 107) 
Before leaving Greeley, Plaintiff contacted R. H. Rock 
Company and offered to sell it the remaining lambs. He 
informed the Defendant that if it wanted to honor the contract, 
to contact him by 9:00 a.m. Saturday, March 10, in Mount 
Pleasant, Utah, otherwise, the lambs would be resold to Rock. 
(Tr. 107-109} When the Defendant only raised its offer to 63c 
per pound, Plaintiff signed the contract to sell to R. H. Rock 
for the equivalent of $70.20 per head. (Tr. 107-109; Exhs. 8, 
9) 
Plaintiff shipped 6283 lambs to R. H. Rock, resulting in a 
loss to him of $166,566.40, plus the unpaid freight of 
$22,000.00 for their transportation from Blythe, California, to 
Ault, Colorado. (Tr. 130-31; Exh. 10) 
On their return from Colorado, Williams and Sparrow 
discussed how much they would pay Jorgensen for the 274 lambs 
delivered on February 27, payment for which was long overdue. 
They determined they would pay him 65i6 per pound instead of the 
previously agreed 701;. (Tr. 737-39; Exhs. 12, 12A, 14A) After 
Sparrow arrived in Yuma, he mailed to Jorgensen in Sanpete 
County a check for the 274 lambs at only 656 per pound. (Tr. 
113, 177, 369-70; Exhs. 12, 12A) 
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After filing a proper claim with the Defendant Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company and with the Packers and Stockyar1s 
Administration of the United States Department of Agriculture, 
Plaintiff brought this action for damages as a result of 
Defendant's breach of contract which breach Plaintiff claims 
was willfully malicious, in bad faith and with a reckless 
indifference and disregard of Plaintiff's rights unde~ the 
contract and the custom and law regarding livestock 
transactions. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Summary of Argument 
1. Venue is proper in Sanpete County, Utah. 
The trial court correctly determined that venue was 
properly laid in Sanpete County, the county of Plaintiff's 
residence. Under Section 78-13-6, u.c.A. (1953), where a 
"transitory" cause of action has arisen outside of the state, 
the plaintiff resident may bring the action in his own county. 
Defendant breached the contract by taking the lambs without 
notice and later refusing delivery of the lambs in Ault, 
Colorado. Even if the provisions of Section 78-13-6 are 
applied, the rules, custom and trade in the livestock industry, 
as well as prior dealings between the parties, regarding 
payment of the purchase price necessarily implies that Sanpete 
County is the place of performance in Utah. 
2. Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees Against Defendant 
John Clay For Its Malicious and Willful Breach of Contract Were 
Prop~i:_. 
Punitive damages and attorneys' fees may properly be 
recovered for the malicious, willful and oppressive breach of 
contract by the Defendant. The jury necessarily found that 
John Clay's breach was willful and malicious. The trial court 
also so found. There is substantial evidence in support of 
these findings •. Justice and equity require that the Defendant 
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bear theo consequence of its conduct outrageously contrary to 
accepted ctlstom, practice and regulation and demonstrating a 
callous indifference to its obligations and Plaintiff's rights 
under the contract. 
3. Plaintiff was properly awarded prejudgment~terest. 
Prejudgment interest is proper when a plain ti ff' s damages 
are "liquidated" or, in other words, fixed and capable of 
calculation as of a certain date. Plaintiff was properly 
awarded such interest from March 24, 1979, to the date of 
judgment. On March 24, Plaintiff's damages were fixed and 
capabl.e of calculation by subtracting from the amount received 
upon resale the amount he would have received at 70.t per poun~. 
The verdict and judgments of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
-18-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
VENUE IS PROPER IN SA..~PETE COUNTY AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I~ 
DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant Defendants' Motion for change of venue to transfer this 
case to Weber County. Appellants claim this case is 
necessarily controlled by Sections 78-13-4 and 78-13-7, U.C.A. 
(1953), and cite various cases where these sections have been 
applied by this Court. But in asserting that these cases 
should have controlled the lower court, Appellants ignore both 
the facts of this case and other statutes regarding proper 
venue. 
The trial court did not err in determining venue is proper 
in Sanpete County. Notwithstanding Defendants' claim to a 
general right to have an action tried in the county of their 
"residence," "actions may be tried elsewhere when so provided 
by statute." Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. _Wa~~~?:.· 631 P.2d 860 
(Utah, 1981). 
Initially, it should be noted that while Defendant Clay 
claims its "principal and only place of business" is in Ogden, 
Weber County (R. 12), none of the contacts or transactions 
between the parties ever occurred in Weber County. Defendant 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, John Clay's bonding Company, 
is also a foreign corporation, transacting business in this 
state. (R.l) 
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John Clay's business with Plaintiff took place either 
outside of the State of Utah or in Sanpete County. (Tr. 293, 
297, 313, 320, 323, 328, 330-33, 337, 100-106, 178, 694; Aff., 
R. 24-25; Exh. 12A) During the sheep season, Mr. Sparrow live~ 
in and worked out of Yuma, Arizona. (Tr. 313, 323; Exh. 1211) 
Mr. Rink Williams also resides in and works out of ~rizona. 
(Tr. 694) 
Mr. Sparrow contacted the Plaintiff in Mount Pleasant, 
Sanpete County, offering to purchase Plaintiff's lambs on feed 
in Blythe, California. Sparrow's written contracts were 
entered into in Mount Pleasant, Sanpete County. (Tr . 60, 287: 
Aff., R. 24, 25) Other lambs owned by Plain ti ff were purchased 
by and delivered to Defendant in Blythe, California, and in 
Sanpete County. (Tr. 292, 296-97) 
The 10,000 lamb contract (App. D) specifically provides 
that the sheep are on pasture at Blythe, California, to be 
sorted and loaded there--"delivery to be £.o.b. truck" at whic~ 
time they were to be paid for. (App. D; R. 25) These lambs 
were later transported from Blythe, California, to Ault, 
Colorado, pursuant to the parties' oral agreement. (Tr. 352) 
While in Ault, Colorado, ,John Clay and Monfort repeatedly 
removed the lambs from the feedlot without any notice to Mr. 
Jorgensen and improperly weighed the lambs loaded on the 
trucks. (Tr. 556, 682) Leon Sparrow called Jorgensen from 
Yuma, Arizona, on each occasion to "apologize" for the failure 
to notify him. (Tr. 374-75, 380) When the Plaintiff objecten 
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to this procedure, Clay repudiated its contract by refusing 
delivery of the lambs f.o.b. truck at the Ault feedlot. ('l'r. 
391-92) Plaintiff's conversations and meetings with Sparrow 
and Williams of John Clay and with Monfort took place either 
personally in California and Colorado or by telephone he-tween 
Mount Pleasant, Arizona, Colorado and California. ('l'r. 
101-108) All payments by John Clay to Jorgensen in this and 
other contracts were made by Sparrow either in California at 
the time and place of delivery or by mail from Arizona to the 
Plaintiff's home in Sanpete County. (Exh. 12A: R. 25) Nothing 
relative to this contract ever transpired in Ogden, Utah. (Tr. 
70, 313, 318, 694-95) 
Under Section 78-13-6, U.C.A. (1953), this action was 
properly brought by Plaintiff in the county of his residence. 
Section 78-13-6 provides: 
All transitory causes of action arising without this state 
in favor of residents of this state shall, if action is 
brought thereon in this state, be brought and tried in the 
county where the plaintiff resides, or in the county where 
the principal defendant resides, or if the principal 
defendant is a corporation, then in the county where the 
plaintiff resides or in the county where such corporation 
has an office or place of business, subject, however, to a 
change of venue as provided by law. 
If the cause of action is transitory, has arisen outside of the 
state and Plaintiff is a resident, then venue is proper in 
Sanpete County, the county of Plaintiff's residence. 
It is clear that the instant case is a "transitory 
action." Allen v. Allen, 47 Utah 145, 151 Pac. 982 (1915). 
~lder v. Third Judicial District Cour~, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 
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P.2d 168, 171 (1954). In Steed v. Harvey, 18 Utah 367, 54 Pac. 
1011 (1898), the Utah court held that an action to recover 
damages for breach of contract for the failure to deliver 
cattle in Wyoming was a transitory action. 
It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff's action arose in 
Colorado first when Defendant John Clay (with Monfort Company! 
took 3517 lambs without any notice to Plaintiff; and later when 
requested in Colorado by Plaintiff to honor the contract, 
Defendant Clay refused to take or accept further deliveries, 
repudiating its obligations under the contract. (Tr. 121, 
105-6, 391-92, 251, 254-55, 717) Even Defendant's counterclab 
that Plaintiff "delayed" delivery in Ault, Colorado, not in 
Utah. (Aplt. Brief, p. 23) This action certainly cannot be 
claimed to have "arisen" in Utah, and venue is controlled by 
Section 78-13-6 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Dee v. San Pedro, 
L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167 Pac. 246 (1917); Seedling 
Inc. v. King, 378 So.2d (Fla. App., 1979); Brig~ 
Transportation Co. v. Ranzenberger, 299 Minn. 127, 217 NW'2d 198 
(1974); State v. Circuit Court, 221 Or. 309, 351 P.2d 39 
(1960); 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, Section 37, p. 882. 
Plaintiff was entitled to bring this action in the county 
of his residence. The trial court should liberally construe 
the Complaint and supporting material in favor of the pleader. 
In fact, the allegations of Plaintiff's ~omplaint and 
supporting Affidavit were not disputed by the Defendants for 
purposes of Defendants' Motion to change venue. (Compl. R. ?, 
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3; Aff., R. 24-26) Even so, the determination of disputed 
matters for the purpose of ruling on proper venue is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Deimler v. Ostler, 600 
p,2d 814, 815 (Mont., 1979); ~ribolet v. Fowler, 77 ~riz. 59, 
266 P.2d 1088 (1954); 77 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 930. 
In Dee v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 50 Utah 167, 167 
Pac. 246 (1917), this Court interpreted the identical 
predecessor section to Section 78-13-6, U.C.A. (1953), and held 
that the action was properly brought in the county of the 
plaintiff's residence, even though the plaintiff was only an 
assignee of the claim. That claim arose from damage to 
livestock being transported by the defendant railroad from Salt 
Lake City to Los Angeles. Plaintiff Dee, an assignee of the 
livestock owner, Sheffor, brought the action in Weber County 
for the injuries to horses while in transit in Nevada and 
California. The railroad claimed that the proper counties for 
venue were either the residence of the livestock owner (Cache 
County) or the "principal place" of defendant's business (Salt 
Lake County). Not only did the court indicate that these 
places of venue were proper under then Section 2931Xl, Comp. 
Laws Utah (1907), the court also held that venue was proper in 
W£ber County, the county of the plaintiff-assignee's residence, 
pursuant to the provisions of the statute. 
In discussing the effect of an assignment to the plaintiff 
on the issue of proper venue, the court, in Dee, stated that if 
a motion for change of venue is "based upon the ground that the 
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action is brought in the wrong county, it should negative the 
facts under which such county would be the proper one." ( 167 
Pac. at 249) In the instant case, as in Dee, the Defendants 
did not "negative" or deny any specific facts alleged in 
Plaintiff's Complaint or his Affidavit supporting venue--e.g., 
Plain ti ff is a resident of Sanpete County ( R. 1 l; the parties 
entered into their contracts in Sanpete County; the lambs were 
to be delivered f.o.b. truck in Ault, Colorado; in Ault, John 
Clay repudiated the contract and refused to take delivery of 
the lambs (R. 2, 25); and payment was to be made to Plaintiff 
in Sanpete County (R. 25). Defendants' response by Affidavit 
was only that John Clay is a Utah corporation with its 
"principal and only place of business in Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah," attaching a copy of the 10,000 lamb contract. ( R. 13, 
14) The Defendants' Affidavit was not sufficient to entitle 
them to have venue transferred to Weber County as a matter of 
right. It added nothing different than already stated in 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, Section 82, P· 
930. 
Affirming the statutory right of Plaintiff to bring this 
action in the county of his residence does not violate any 
pol icy to avoid undue expense, inconvenience or disadvantage to 
Defendants. Although some pretrial discovery was conducted in 
Salt Lake City for the convenience of both parties, the bulk of 
discovery took place in Colorado. At trial, Defendants did not 
incur any significant additional expense by bringing its 
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various trial witnesses from Colorado to Sanpete County than 
had the trial been held in Weber County. Moreover, Defendant's 
officer, Rink Williams, presumably traveled to the trial from 
his Phoenix residence--a shorter distance to Manti than to 
Ogden. 
Respondent submits that the evidence of Defendant's breach, 
malicious and with flagrant, reckless disregard for Plaintiff's 
rights, is so clear and unequivocal in the trial record that 
ilie jury's verdict cannot be considered "manifestly unjust." 
There is absolutely no reason to suppose that the Sanpete 
County jury was unfairly impassioned or prejudiced for or 
against either party. Respondent further believes that the 
legislature was fully aware that the inconvenience and 
disadvantage in litigating disputes arising in foreign states 
is just as great for a resident plaintiff as for a resident 
defendant. The policy to protect a party litigant from undue 
inconvenience and disadvantage is the same whether plaintiff or 
~fendant. 
In this case, virtually all of the transactions between the 
parties, including Defendant's repeated breach, occurred 
outside of the State of Utah. Plaintiff's cause of action 
arose outside of Utah. Venue, under Section 78-14-6, is 
therefore proper in Sanpete County. None of the cases cited by 
Appellants involves such facts similar to this case. Certain 
of these cases even involved oral and not written 
contracts--i.e., Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 61 
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Utah 559, 216 Pac. 684 (1923); Olympia Sales ~~v_~, 604 
P.2d 919 (Utah, 1979). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the provisions of Section 
78-13-4, U.C.A. (1953), should be applied to the agreement 
between the parties, venue is still proper in Sanpete County. 
This section applies to written contracts where the place of 
obligation is stated or appears by "necessary implication." 
Palfreyman v. Trueman, 105 Utah 463, 142 P.2d 677 (1943). ~ 
noted, the contract expressly provides that Defendant is to 
perform by taking delivery of the livestock at the time they 
are loaded on the trucks, f .o.b. at Blythe, California (and 
later, Ault, Colorado). 
Further, payment for the delivered animals must be made at 
that time, either at the place of delivery or Plaintiff's 
residence in Sanpete County. "Balance of purchase price shall 
be paid when livestock are loaded on cars." (App. D) All 
payments made were made in that manner. ( R. 2 5 ; Exh . l '2A) 
Plaintiff's Affidavit states that "it was the intent of the 
parties that the livestock purchased by John Clay and 
Company would be paid for by mailing or delivering the purchase 
price to Affiant in Sanpete County, Utah." (R. 25) There is 
no evidence to the contrary. Plain ti ff' s undisputed Affidavit 
was properly considered by the trial court to support the 
"necessary implication" that Plaintiff's residence in Sanpete 
County was the place of payment in Utah. Deimler v. Ostler, 
supra, at 815. Any question of interpretation arising from the 
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language of the written contract (prepared by Sparrow) is 
properly resolved in favor of Respondent and against Appellants. 
Under the Federal Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as 
amended (7 U.S.C., Section 181, et seq.), a "market agency" or 
"dealer" (e.g., John Clay and Company) shall, upon delivery of 
the livestock, deliver to the livestock seller the net proceeds 
of the purchase price, with a full accounting, before the end 
of the next business day. (Tr. 370, 645) It requires that if 
the seller is not present to receive the check at the time of 
delivery of the sheep, the payment must be timely mailed first 
class, postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the seller. 
u.s.c., Section 228b; Regs. of Sec. of Agriculture, Packers 
Stockyards Act, 9 CFR, Section 201.43. (Pertinent parts of 
the regulations are attached as Appendix E.) 
As provided in Atlas Acceptance Corporation v. Pratt, 85 
Utah 352, 39 P.2d 710, 714 (1935), a "necessary implication" 
does not require the court to "shut out every other possible or 
imaginary conclusion," but rather to take what would be a 
"reasonable view," the contrary of which would be improbable. 
39 P. 2d at 714. Th is is not a case where the court has to 
guess where or how the parties intended that Clay should 
perform its contract. There can be "no room to doubt" that the 
law and the contract required and the parties intended that if 
payment for the sheep was not made to Plaintiff at the time and 
place of delivery in California or Colorado, payment would be 
made by mailing to Plaintiff's residence in Sanpete County. 
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Even under the provisions of Section 78-13-4 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended), venue was proper in Sanpete County. Itel-Pas Inc,"· 
Jones, 389 So.2d 1085 (Fla. App., 1980); State v. Circuit 
Court, 221 Or. 309, 351 P.2d 39 (1960). Such a determination 
by the trial court was proper and reasonable. 
If initially an action is brought in the proper county, it 
does not lie within the prerogative of the defendant or trial 
court to transfer it to another county merely because venue 
might also have been proper there. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Walker, supra, at 861; Tribolet v. Fowler, 77 ~riz. 59, 260 
P.2d 1088 (1954); Deimler v. Ostler, 600 P.2d 814, 815 (Mont., 
1979) 
Although this action might have been properly brought in 
Weber County, Plaintiff chose a county equally, if not more, 
proper. Defendants did not have an "absolute right" to have 
the action transferred to Weber County when Sanpete County was 
proper. 
The laws regarding venue are not intended to permit a 
defendant to conduct business dealings and incur extensive 
obligations in other states and counties only to run back to 
its office to claim the exclusive venue of Weber County when it i 
has repudiated those obligations. Appellants' complaint that 
they must have been prejudiced because a jury in Weber county 
might have found differently is self-serving and arises only 
because of the outcome of the jury's deliberation. It is not 
supported by the facts or record herein. 
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Moreover, Appellants waived whatever right they claimed 
when they requested (and received) an extension of time "to 
answer" Plaintiff's Complaint. IR. 23) Nello L. Teer Co. v. 
Hitchcock Corporation, 235 N.C. 741, 71 S.E.2d 54 (1952). 
Defendants' Motion for change of venue was properly denied 
by the trial court. 
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POINT II 
I 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF A 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEE BASED UPON DEFENDANT'S WILLFUL 
AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT. 
Appellants maintain that th€ trial court erred in 
submitting to the jury th€ question of punitive damages for 
John Clay's offensive conduct. Specifically, Defendants 
complain that there is no basis for the trial court's awar~ of 
a reasonable attorneys' f€e. (Aplt. Brief, pp. 31-32) 
Appellants ignore the substantial evidence which fully supports 
both the jury's verdict and the court's finding that the 
Def€ndant's conduct was "willful and malicious." 
Instruction No. 25, (not No. 4 as cited by Appellants) 
permitted the jury to consider an award to Plaintiff of 
punitive damages if it found that "Defendant's conduct in 
injuring Plaintiff was willful and malicious." (Instruction 
25; JIFU, Section 90.76) The jury so found and awarded, 
punitive damage, albeit one dollar. By stipulation, the 
consideration of attorneys' fees was left to the trial court 
(and not the jury) for determination. (Pretrial Order, R. 841 
Th€ trial court found as the jury did and entered its finding 
that the "conduct of the Defendant John Clay and Company and 
its officers and employees was willful, malicious and 
oppressive as found by the jury." (App. C, Finding U) Based 
upon this finding and the undisputed affidavit of reasonable 
attorneys' f€es, Plaintiff was awarded $21,400.00 attorneys 
fees. 
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Since attorneys' fees and costs of litigation may be 
appropriately considered by a trial court as an element or part 
of punitive damages, Appellants' real dispute appears to be the 
propriety of punitive damages and the sufficiency of the 
findings of willful and malicious conduct. DeBry_~~~_Hil~~~ 
Travel v. Capital International Airways, 538 P.2d 1181, 1185 
(Utah, 1978); Linscott ~g~12ie_i::._~~ti~na1=_ _~if_e _Insu;:_1!12£e__Co., 
100 Ida. 854, 606 P.2d 958, 966 (1980); Kramer and Schnebeck, 
"Punitive Damages in Idaho," 17 Idaho L.R. 87, 90 (1980); 
Mallar and Roberts, "Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled 
Approach," The 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 649-50, 668 (1980). Even 
the case of Lyman Grazing Association v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 
473 P.2d 905 (1970), cited by Appellants, states that 
attorneys' fees are appropriate upon a showing of fraud, malice 
or w~nt~~e_~~ such as would sustain an award of punitive 
damages. 473 P.2d at 908. 
The propriety of punitive damages in contract actions has 
been the subject of substantial recent discussion by courts and 
scholars which is ignored in Appellants' Brief. "Developments 
in Utah Law," 1979 Utah Law Rev., 347, 367-70; Sullivan, 
"Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract," 61 Minn. L.Rev. '207 
(1976-77); "The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in 
Contract Actions," 8 Indiana L.Rev. 668, 681 (1974); 31 The 
Hastings L.J. 639, supra; "Punitive Damages in Contract 
Actions, etc.," 20 Washburn L.J. 86 (1980), Lee, "Punitive 
Damages on Ordinary Contracts," 42 Mont L.Rev. 93 (1981) and 
numerous cases cited therein. 
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Appellants' attempt to constrict the law is not even 
supported by their own cases. Contrary to their assertion in 
the affirmative, it is not necessary to show "an underlying 
tort" as the basis for a punitive damage award. (Aplt. Brief 
at 27) For example, Cur_t_i,_ss v. Aetna Lif~_In~ur~l'!S:~-~~· qo 
N.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169, 172-73 (N.M. App., 1976), states that 
"willful and wanton" means an "actual or deliberate intention 
to harm" or "an utter indifference to or conscious disregard 
for the rights of others." The award of punitive damages was 
affirmed. In Lull v. Wick Construction Co., 614 P.2d 321 
(Alaska, 1980), that court observed that punitive damages are 
allowed in some states for "malicious or grossly reckless" 
breach of contract but that in Alaska no punitive damages were ! 
recoverable on any basis. (614 P.2d at 325) But, see Clary 
Insurance Agency v. DoY!.E;_, 620 P. 2d 194, 202-204 (Alaska 1 q9Q) 
where an Alaskan award of punitive damages was affirmed by thal 
court. 
While some courts may categorize such conduct as the 
equivalent of an "independent tort," other courts merely refer 
to it as "willful," "malicious" or "reckless disregard for 
plaintiff's rights". Regardless of the label, the focus is not! 
upon a convenient catch word but on the nature and type of 
Defendant's wrongful conduct and the manner in which the 
contract is breached. Nash v. Craiq~q, 585 P.2d 775, 778 
(Utah, 1978); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380, 
382 (1963); Palombi v. D&C_B~i_l_qe_rs, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 p, 2d 
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325 (1969). In PalqJl!Qh• this Court reversed a nonjury award of 
punitive damages because there was no record of willful, 
malicious conduct by defendant. In Nash, this Court reversed 
the ruling of the lower court that punitive damages were not 
available in a suit for specific performance of a contract. 
see 1979 Utah L.R., supra, at 368-69. See, also Elkington v. 
Fou~1:_, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah, 1980). 
See, also, Linscott v. Ranier National Life Insurance Co., 
supra, at 962 (disregard of the known property or legal rights 
of others}; Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 
368, 378 (1967); Sta~\'_~ Ois1:_i::_h_c:_1:__c_qu_!:.1:_, 149 Mont. l31, 423 
P.2d 598 (1967) (violation of state law); Fausel v. Ted Walker 
Mobile Homes Inc., 60? P.2d 507, 510-11 (Ariz. App., 1979); 
Kiser v. Gilmore, 2 Kan. App. 2d 638, 587 P.2d 911 (1979) 
("wanton disregard for the rights of others"); Ver_nol'!-1:J:.~~ 
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp, 316 N.E. 2d 381, 384 (Ind. 
App., 1974)(a "heedless disregard of the consequences, malice, 
~ass fraud or oppressive conduct"}; Amoco Production Co. v. 
Alexander, 594 s.w. 2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App., 1979)(failure to 
~rform as a "reasonably prudent operator" under a lease 
agreement); Ad<;_Jl!~~-~i_tfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla., 
1974)("gross negligence indicating a wanton disregard for the 
rights of others"); 31 The Hastings L •. J., ~r_'!, at 651-59; 8 
Indiana L.R., supra, at 681. In each of these cased, punitive 
damages were properly awarded for malicious and willful breach 
of contract. 
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In Defendant's contract there was an implied covenant of 
good faith and cooperation to prevent the parties from impeding 
the other's performance of his contractual obligation. Section 
70A-l-203, u.c.A. (1953 as amended); Zion's Properties v. Holt, 
538 P.2d 1319 (Utah, 1975); Whitfield Construction Company v. 
Commercial Development Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982, 1009 (D.C, 
V.I., 1975). John Clay had a contract with and a duty ~ 
Plaintiff Jorgensen. Defendant was not just "caught" in 
between Plaintiff and Monfort. (Tr. 105, 410, 735) 
In Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., H18 Ca 1. Rtr. 480, 510 
P.2d 1032, 1037 (1973), the California court stated that a 
party to a contract has "an implied duty to deal in good 
faith." The breach of such a duty may even give rise to an 
"independent tort," depending upon the nature and manner of the 
Defendant's conduct. Garrett v. American Family_li~~~al 
Insurance Co., 520 s.w. 2d 102, 121 (Mo. App.) First Security 
Bank of Bozeman v. Goddar:._9_, 593 p.'.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. l979) 
The claim that there is "ample evidence" of Defendant's 
good faith is not supported by the facts, but is only 
Defendant's rationalizations from the facts. (Aplt. Brief at 
29) Any evidence for and against the "good faith" argument of 
John Clay was properly weighed by the jury. For example, it 
was a jury decision whether Defendant's knowing violations of 
government regulations or its "compromise" offer after the 
market price had dropped to 60c per pound were "good faith" 
attempts to resolve the contract or were selfish acts without 
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regard to Plaintiff's rights. Based upon substantial evidence 
supporting Plaintiff, the jury and the trial court reasonably 
found that John Clay did not act in good faith or with 
justification. Appellant cannot now reargue the evidence. 
Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior_~Q:_,· 546 P.2d 885, 88fi 
(Utah, 1976). Grybauskas v. Associated Estates Corp., 51 Ohio 
App. 2d 231, 367 N.E. 2d 881 (1976) 
Another claim raised by Appellants is an alleged lack of 
sufficient evidence of the willful and malicious conduct of 
John Clay. Respondent submits that the record is replete with 
evidence of gross misrepresentations, conduct contrary to the 
established customs and practices in the industry, knowing 
violations of federal regulations, and an attitude of reckless 
disregard for Plaintiff's right to be treated honestly and 
fairly under the contract. 
For example: 
1. On at least five different days, John Clay and Monfort 
shipped Plaintiff's lambs from the Weber feedlot without prior 
notification, despite repeated promises to Plaintiff that he 
would be notified. (Tr. 375, 380, 501-2, 619) 
2. The takings without notice to Plaintiff were a gross 
deviation from established custom and practice in the livestock 
industry and accepted dealings between the parties. (Tr. 173, 
191-94, 202-203, 205, 404, 408, 682-83: 9 CFR, Section 203.16) 
3. The lambs taken were not weighed on "the nearest public 
scale" and admittedly were not loaded or weighed according to 
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either long-established custom and practice nor Packers and 
Stockyards regulations. Defendant falsely stated the lambs 
were properly loaded and weighed. This resulted in unnecessary 
weight loss to the lambs before their weighing. (Tr. 354, 191, 
548-51, 556, 609, 744-45, 752-54) 
4. Defendant knowingly never provided official scale 
tickets to Plaintiff. (Tr. 176, 278; 9 CFR, Section 201.49) 
5. Defendant intentionally and repeatedly failed to pay 
Plaintiff within the time required by Packers and Stockyards 
regulations. (Tr. 370, 577, 645-47; 9 CFR, Section 201.43) 
6. Defendant refused to accept delivery of Plaintiff's 
lambs at 70¢ per pound after the market price had dropped to 
approximately 60 per pound. (Tr. 109, 177, 251, 580-81, 735) 
7. Defendant attempted to intimidate ~laintiff to accept a 
lower discounted price for his lambs if he "planned to be in 
business" the next year. (Tr. 251-57, 271-72; 9 CFR Section 
201.43(4)) 
8. Defendant attempted to "discount" the weight of 
Plaintiff's lambs, a business practice condemned as unfair by 
the Packers and Stockyards Administration. (Tr. 116, 557-58, 
686-88) 
9. Defendant failed properly to pay Plaintiff for lambs 
received under an oral contract at 73¢ per pound. 
10. Defendant refused to pay timely Plaintiff for 274 
lambs at 70¢ per pound and, instead, paid only 65¢ per pound 
after Defendant had determined not to take any more lambs from 
Plaintiff. (Tr. 113-117, 214, 370) 
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11. Sparrow admitted to Plaintiff that .John /Clay still had 
an obligation to take Plaintiff's lambs but that Plaintiff 
would have to sue. (Tr. 392, 410, 105) 
12. John Clay asserted that just because Monfort wouldn't 
take the lambs, John Clay wouldn't take them. (Tr. 105\ 
Plaintiff believes that the above facts in the record 
supply more than adequate evidence of Defendant's egregious 
conduct. The finding by a jury of willful, wanton and 
malicious conduct is certainly supported by substantial 
evidence. Kiser v. Gilmore, supra; Whitehead v. Allen, 63 N.M. 
63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957); Curt~~._~et~~~~~-Insurance Co., 
Supra. In fact, to imagine a greater demonstration of 
indifference and callous contempt for the parties' agreement is 
difficult. 
This is not just a case of "nonfeasance," but of active 
"misfeasance" by Defendant John Clay. The decision in Dahl v. 
Prince, 119 Utah 556, 230 P.2d 328 (1951), cited by Appellant, 
is not at all inconsistent with the judgment herein. ~here was 
no finding in Dahl of any willful or malicious conduct and no 
punitive damage was awarded. The Court's opinion does suggest 
that if such a finding and award were made at trial, then an 
award of attorneys' fees would be entirely appropriate. 230 
P.2d at 329. 
There is no economic "injustice" to the Defendant nor 
"windfall" to the Plaintiff by the Findings and Judgment. 
Punitive damages are often necessary to fully compensate the 
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Plaintiff, particularly if the economic bargaining power oft~ 
Plaintiff is inferior to the "oppressors" (i.e., Defendant Clai 
and Monfort). To restrict Plaintiff to recover only the 
purchase price under the contract requires the Defendant to do 
no more than it was originally required to do in 1979. The 
most serious consequence to John Clay is that it will 
eventually have to pay only what it owed in the first place. 
In fact, the Defendant has now economically benefitted by not 
having to pay Plaintiff until after at least ?. 1/2 years. Not 
only has the Plaintiff not been able to enjoy the benefit of 
his contract, but he has had to bear considerable expense of 
recovery in excess of the trial court's award. (R. 177-79) 
person with a legitimate cause of action should not be 
discouraged from seeking relief because of substantial expense, 
particularly in light of the improper motive and conduct of a 
defendant. 8 Indiana L. Rev., supra, at 671-679 (1975); 61 
Minn. L. Rev., supr~, at 239-241 (1976); 31 Hastings L .. J., 
supra, at 649-50, 662-68. 
An award merely of conventional "compensatory" damages 
results in a net economic loss to the Plaintiff. Economic 
efficiency demands that the party intentionally breaching the 
contract bear the cost resulting from his actions. Otherwise, 
litigation costs and fees decrease the commitment of financial 
resources to the production of goods and makes a claim for 
damages impractical. Farber, "Reassessing the Economic 
" 6' Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 0 
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Virginia L.Rev. 1443 (1980); Birmingham, "Breach of Contract, 
Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency," 24 Rutgers L.Rev. 27'3 
( 1970). 
Defendants argue that the attorneys' fees must be 
proportional to the one dollar punitive damage award. By 
stipulation, the Pretrial Order reserved the issue of 
Plaintiff's attorneys' fee for consideration by the Court and 
not the jury. The jury did not have the opportunity to 
consider the extent of Plaintiff's costs and fees and interest 
as an element of his damage. Had they done so, their 
compensatory or punitive damage awards might well have been 
substantially different. 22 AmJur 2d, Damages, Section 168, p. 
237. 
Appellants' argument that the attorneys' fees awarded must 
be proportional to the amount of punitive damages awarded is 
not supported by Terry v. zc~1, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah, 1980). It 
is the rule that punitive damages (including Plaintiff's 
attorneys' fees) must not be disproportionate to the act~al 
damages suffered; "or perhaps more appropriately, to the nature 
of the wrong done and the injury caused." Kesler v. Rogers, 
542 P.2d 354, 359 (1975). The attorneys' fees awarded here, 
although substantial, can hardly be considered disproportionate 
to the jury's verdict of $191,000.00 nor the defendant's 
conduct. 
In the case of Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Ida. 
?66, 561 P.2d 1299, 1314 (1977), the defendant argued, however, 
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that the $12, 500 .00 attorneys' fee awarded was not "reasonably 
related" to the $10,434.00 jury fee awarded. There, an Idaho 
statute allowed attorneys' fees against a bonding company. The 
court stated: 
We must also disagree with defendants' argument that the 
amount of an award of attorney's fees must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the amount of the judgment. It 
is the rule in this jurisdiction that where attorney's fees 
are to be awarded the amount thereof is to be that sum 
which the trial court in its discretion determines is 
reasonable. The factors to be considered have been 
previously stated by this Court. 
"What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for 
the determination of the court, taking into 
consideration the nature of the litigation, the amount 
involved in the controversy, the length of time 
utilized in preparation for and the trial of the case 
and other related factors viewed in the light of the 
knowledge and experience of the court as a lawyer and 
judge; it is not necessary in this connection that he 
hear any evidence on the matter although it is proper 
that the court may have before it the opinion of 
experts. [Citations omittedl 
At the hearing held in these cases on the amount to be 
awarded plaintiffs as attorney's fees, evidence on these 
factors was introduced and considered by the trial court 
• • • • 561 P.2d, supra, at 1314. 
Plaintiff did not receive an attorneys' fee award in an 
excessively "punitive" amount, but, in fact, less than the 
costs and expenses which he has actually incurred as a result 
of the Defendants' conduct. 
Even aside from any punitive damage award here, it is the 
recently pronounced policy of this state to award attorneys 
fees to a prevailing party when the defense to the action was 
without merit or good faith. Section 78-27-57, u.c.A (1953, as 
amended 1981). Based upon the finding and verdict below and 
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the inherent equitable power and discretion of this r.ourt, it 
may also award additional attorneys' fees for the expense of 
this appeal. Swain v. Salt ~~~~_ge~l,_~~~~~~~ Investment Co~, 
3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955). 
The judgment and award of attorneys' fees by the trial 
court should be affirmed and additional attorneys' fees awarded 
for this appeal. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
When Appellant refused to honor its contract with 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff was left with some 6,300 lambs in Ault, 
being fed and cared for daily at Plaintiff's expense. To 
reduce this loss, Plaintiff resold them immediately to R. H. 
Rock Company. (Exhs. 8, 9 and 10) The jury awarded Plaintiff 
damages based upon the difference between what Plaintiff should 
have received under the contract (Exh. 1) and what he received 
from R. H. Rock. 
Appellant claims the Court improperly awarded prejudgment 
interest thereon from March 24, 1979. March 24 was the date of 
the last shipment and delivery of lambs by Plaintiff to R.H. 
Rock. 
Appellant does not dispute that portion of the interest 
related to Defendant's agreement to reimburse Plaintiff for the 
freight from California to Colorado and the difference between 
274 lambs at 65/ and 70/ per pound (approximately $2,000.00). 
Respondent notes with interest that Appellant cites as 
authority the very cases upon which Respondent relied in the 
lower court to support the award. Bjo~~-~~eril Indust~i~ 
Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah, 1977); Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. Wh~ 
Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah, 1976); and Jae~~-~~~~~ 
Construction Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah, 1976). These 
-42-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cases affirm that when the amount due under a contract is 
ascertainable at a particular time (i.e., March 24, 1979), 
interest is proper from that date. Each of these cases awarded 
prejudgment interest in other similar contract or damage 
act ions. 
Respondent submits that Appellant has erroneously applied 
the principles evoked from these cases to the instant facts. 
Also, Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 
101 (Utah, 1978), (miscited by Appellants in their brief), 
supports the award in this case. 
In Anderson, the insured sued to recover the reasonable 
value of certain insured personal items such as clothing, 
liquor and a television set. This Court held that the owner of 
the lost items was entitled to give hi~ opinion of the value 
thereof and the replacement cost. He need not prove an "actual 
cash value at the date of the loss." (583 P.2d at 104) The 
testimony is to be given such weight and credibility "as the 
trier of fact finds reasonable under the circumstances." Id. 
Therefore, this Court reiterated its general rule that: 
Prejudgment interest should be awarded in a case, such as 
this, where the loss is fixed as of a particular time and 
the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, and plaintiff is entitled thereto. Id. 
Defendants' argument as to what the jury might have decided 
is irrelevant since it did determine that Defendant John Clay 
breached the contract and the Plaintiff did not "interfere" 
with it and awarded Plaintiff damages. Just as in other cases, 
the liability or alleged good faith excuse of a defendant is an 
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issue for the jury and is not relevant here. And_~~so~:_Pr:[_~J:t_a_'.' 
Oil Corp. v. Parker, 245 F.2d 831, 837 (10th Cir., 1957). 
Following Defendant's breach, Plaintiff disposed of his 
lambs as quickly as possible and received $70.20 per animal. 
Had he been able to receive the full contract price, he would 
have received an additional $166,566.40. Appellant ignores t~ 
fact that even after Appellant's breach until the date of 
shipment of the last lambs, Plaintiff was required to continue 
to pay the feedlot charges for their care and feeding. When 
the last lambs were weighed and delivered, Plaintiff's damage 
was then capable of mathematical calculation. Appellants no 
not seem to have any difficulty making the calculations in 
their Brief. Instead, they attempt to reargue the 
"speculation" of what John Clay might have done had it not 
breached the contract. (Applt. Brief at 34-35) 
was 
In Jack B. Parsons Construction Co., the contract amount 
sufficiently ascertainable by calculation even though there i 
was a dispute as to the proper method of calculation of the 
damages. 552 P. 2d at 109. In Bjor~2~-~E_r_Ll,_ _Indu_~~~~s, Inc~, 
supra, the court specifically listed those types of cases where 
damages would be "incomplete" or could not be calculated wi~ 
"mathematical accuracy" (e.g., personal injury, false 
imprisonment, wrongful death, de fama ti on, etc.). Such is not 
the case where, as here, the loss can be measured by facts ano 
figures. Just as the market value of the stock was fixed in 
Bjork, the market price of the lambs here was fixed by contract 
and the weight then determined. 
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In U.S. Fideli:t=Y__~~Gu~ran~y_~o~~~~~over Creek Cattle 
co., 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (Idaho, 1969), the Idaho court imposed 
prejudgment interest on the obligation which a cattle purchaser 
and his surety owed to the seller. The buyer owed for two 
shipments of a total of 137 head of cattle. The court stated 
that: 
.. ~W]here the amount of liability is liquidated or 
capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical processes as 
it is here, this Court has allowed interest from a time 
prior to judgment, for in that event the interest in fully 
compensating the injured party predominates over other 
equitable considerations. 452 P.2d at 1004. 
See, also, Automated Medical Laboratories Inc. v. Armour 
Pharmaceutical Company, 629 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir., 1980); 
and Anderson-Prichard Oil ~i::_p_~ _v .__Pa_r:_k.~i::_, supra. 
While a mere six percent annual interest cannot "fully 
compensate the injured party" when compared with present double 
digit interest and inflation rates, it is a proper step towaro 
providing such complete and equitable compensation. 
-45-
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CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict in favor of Respondent and against the 
Defendants is supported by substantial evidence and should be 
affirmed. The funding by the jury and by the court of 
Defendant, John Clay's, willful malicious and oppressive 
conduct and the award of costs and attorneys fees as punitive 
damages should also be affirmed. 
Venue was proper in Sanpete County and the trial court did 
not err or abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
Defendant's Motion to Change Venue to Weber County. 
The proceedings in lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of November, 1981. 
/~~ 
l ..< ------- ---------
~rthur l'L Nielse 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Neil Jorgensen 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
-46-
--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.... 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3350 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a corporation, 
and AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPAJ.'.'Y, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. c-7894 
The jury duly impaneled in the above-entitled matter having 
returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and 
against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of 
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages; and the 
Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company having stipulated, 
through its counsel, that in the event of a judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant that the said Defendant 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company was and is liable to the 
Plaintiff in an amount of $75,000.00, and there being no just 
reason why judgment should not be entered immediately upon said 
verdict, 
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and against the Defendant John Clay and 
Company in the sum of $191,464.40, of which amount judgment is 
further entered in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and 
against the Defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company in the 
sum of $75,000.00, together with interest on all of said judgment 
as shall hereafter be determined by the Court. Plaintiff is 
further awarded his costs incurred herein. 
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Pursuant to the Pretrial Order, the amount of interest, 
any, and whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and, 
so, the amount thereof are reserved for future determination t 
the Court. 
DATED this July, 1980. 
-· 
'11:. ··,-~··.: ~"· 
'%;.:: 0~ ;;. ~-~" , .. ,,,, ... ~ ....... ~ 
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1900 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a 
corporation, and AETNA 
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-7894 
JUDG~c;.;; 
JJUDGM:;t:·.· 
fiila._tl ,, / ,. ~-· ---L---P~90 __ ~ 
The court entered on July 8, 1980, its Judgment on the 
jury's verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and 
against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of 
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages and 
against Defendant Aetna casualty and Surety Company in the sum 
of $75,000.00, reserving in said Judgment for future determination 
the amount, if any, to be awarded to Plaintiff as interest and 
attorneys' fees. Thereafter, said Judgment was appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court by the Defendants, which court dismissed said 
appeal and returned the case to this Court for the purpose of 
determining the issues relating to interest and attorneys• fees. 
This Court having entered its Supplemental Judgment and considered 
the objections thereto by the Defendants and the memoranda 
submitted by the respective parties, and having entered its 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, makes the 
following Amended Order: 
NOW, THEREFORE, Plaintiff is hereby awarded further judgment 
against the Defendant John Clay and Company as follows: 
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1. Interest from March 24, 1979, to July 8, 19 80, in , .. , 
sum of $14,822.37. 
2. Interest from July 8, 1980, to January 25, 1981, 10 
amount of $9,087.21 and further interest at the rate of $45.i 
per day thereafter. 
3. Attorneys' fees in the amount of $21,400.00. 
The foregoing is supplemental and in addition to the JuC::--
heretofore entered by the Court on July 8, 1980, in the sum,,, 
$191,463.40 general damages and $1.00 punitive damages, toget. 
with Plaintiff's ccsts in the sum of $276.30, of which $75,o,:· 
was awarded against both Defendants . .. 
DATED this 2-=3 day of Februar;u..J3.!l:::....:-----.----
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Clark R. Nielsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1900 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a 
corporation, and AETNA 
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
civil No. c-7894 
The Court entered on July 8, 1980, its Judgment on the jury's 
verdict in favor of the Plaintiff Neil Jorgensen and against the 
Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of $191,463.40 general 
damages and $1.00 punitive damages and against Defendant Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Company in the sum of $75,000.00, reserving 
in said Judgment for future detennination the amount, if any, to 
be awarded to Plaintiff as interest and attorneys' fees. There-
after, said Judgment was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court by 
the Defendants, which court dismissed said appeal and returned 
the case to this Court for the purpose of determining the issues 
relating to interest and attorneys' fees. This Court having 
entered its Supplemental Judgment and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in support thereof, and having considered the 
objections thereto by Defendants and the memoranda submitted by 
the respective parties, now enters the following Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The conduct of the Defendant John Clay and Company and 
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its officers and employees was wilful, malicious and oppre~~. 
as found by the jury. 
2. By reason of the wilful, malicious and oppressive c, .. _ 
of Defendant John Clay and Company and its officers and dire:c· 
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee for pro:::1 
this action. 
3. From March 3, 1979, through October 31, 1980, Plaine.: 
counsel have devoted in excess of 380 hours in representing 
Plaintiff's interest in seeking recovery from Defendants, 
including, among other things, numerous telephone calls; 
investigation; research of the law; photocopying; preparatio:. 
and filing of pleadings; preparation and filing memoranda i:-. 
opposition to Defendants' motion for change of venue; appea:a:: I 
in court re motion for change of venue; taking of depositions I 
of Defendants' principal officers; representing Plaintiff in 
connection with depositions taken by Defendants of Plaintif~ r- I 
his son in Salt Lake City and depositions of third-party w1tr.;<e: 
in Greeley, Colorado; preparation for trial; preparation oft::. 
memoranda; preparation of proposed instructions to the jury::.: 
trial of the case in Manti involving four days. 
4. Also, Plaintiff's counsel has represented Plaintiff:: 
Plaintiff's motion for attorneys 1 fees and interest, includir.~ 
the research, preparation and filing of memoranda and affidavl'. 
and oral argument of Plaintiff's motion. 
5. This matter further involved unique questions of la~ 
and fact. 
6. Considering the nature of the action, the amount of 
ti.me and expertise involved, the result obtained and the us'Jal 
and ordinary charges made by attorneys in the State of Utah an: 
particularly in Sanpete County, an attorneys' fee of s21, 4oo.o': 
is a reasonable fee for the services rendered and includes :.;,e 
sum of $1, 400. 00 of costs and expenses incurred for airline i-;. 
automobile travel, hotel and motel expense in connection 1>.·i:· 
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the trial and the taking of depositions in Greeley, Colorado. 
7. The Plaintiff should be awarded interest on the amount 
of damages sustained by him from March 24, 1979, to July 8, 1980, 
at the rate of 6% per annum ($31.47 per day) for 471 days for an 
amount of $14,822.37 against the Defendant John Clay and Company. 
8. The Plaintiff should be awarded interest from the date 
of the Judgment on the verdict (July 8, 1980) to the date of the 
entry of this Order at the rate of 8% per annum for an amount of 
$9,087.21 to January 25, 1981, and $45.21 per day thereafter 
against the Defendant John Clay and Company. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment 
against Defendant John Clay and Company for interest from March 
24, 1979, to July 8, 1980, in the amount of $14,822.37. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment for 
interest against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the 
amount of $9,087.21 to January 25, 1981, and $45.21 per day 
thereafter. 
3. The Plaintiff should be awarded an additional judgment 
against the Defendant John Clay and Company in the sum of 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact a: 
Conclusions of Law and accompanying Amended Supplemental Jud?..! 
by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to Mr. Richard 11. 
Campbell and Mr. Richard L. Stine, 2 650 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, this ~day of February, 1981. 
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I • 
r' .. .O L.-.<= porice <;><C ..,,..._.on k0o<1 ..,.,. ,.:.-<>.._.,.._.-y 
old. t.hc da.t.e or sale. l.he nQ.OT>C o( t..l-,.e 
purcha..:ser. t.he commlsslon. e.nd ot.her 
lawful cha.-ges, and such other facts a.s 
may be necessary to complete the ac-
count and show fully the tru. e nature \ 
of the transaction. 
<bl Prompt payment for ltvestock-
lerTn$ and conditions. < U No packer. 
market agency, or dealer shall pur-
chase livestock for which payment Is 
made by a draft whch Is not a check, 
unless the seller expressly agrees In 
writing before the transaction that 
payment may be made by such a draft. 
<In cases of packers whose average 
annual purchases exceed $500,000, and 
market agencies and dealers acting as 
agents for such packers, see also 
1201.200.) 
<2><1l No packer, market agency, or 
dealer purchasing livestock tor cash 
and not on credit, whether tor slaugh-
ter or not tor slaughter, shall mail a 
check In payment for the livestock 
unless the check ls placed In an enve- · 
lope with proper first class postage 
prepaid and properly addressed to the 
seller or such person as he may direct, 
In a post office, letter box, or other re-
ceptacle re11ularly used for the deposit 
of mall for delivery, from which such 
envelope ts scheduled to be collected 
<al before the close of the next bust· 
ness day following the purchase of 
livestock and transfer of posse ... ion 
thereof, or <bl In the case of a chase 
on a "carcass" or "grade and yield" 
basis. before the close ot the first busi-
ness day following determination of 
the purchase price. 
!Ill No packer. market agency, or 
dealer purchasing livestock for slaugh-
ter, shall mail a check In payment for 
the livestock unless <al the check Is 
made available for actual delivery and 
the seller or his duly authorized repre-
sentative Is not present to receive pay. 
ment, at the point of transfer of pos-
session of such livestock, on or before 
the cll'Se of the next business day fol-
lowln11 the purchase of the livestock 
and transfer of possession thereof, or. 
In the case of a purchase on a "car-
cass" or "11rade and yield" basts, on or 
before the close of the first business 
day following determination of the 
purchase price; or unless <bl the seller 
expressly &11rees In wrltln11 before the 
L..- • ._-,,,..._n.coL•<.,, ~.-, .. .._ .O•o.Y•""'.-.L """' .... ,, ~-<= 
n->.&.de by ,..._.ch .-na.\Hng ol ..._ c:hcc"'-. 
< 3 > Any agreement. referred \..o ln 
para.graphs (b) <1) or l2> of this sec 
t lon. shall be disclosed tn the record.:_ 
of any market agency or dealer selH.ng 
such livestock, and ln the records of 
the packer, market agency or dealer 
purchasing such livestock, and re 
talned by such person tor such time "" 
Is required by any law. or by written 
notice served on such person by the 
Administrator. but not less than twc 
calendar years from the date of expl· 
ration thereof. 
<t> No packer, market agency or 
dealer shall. as a condition of purchase 
by him of livestock. impose, demand. 
compel or dictate the terms or manner 
of payment, or attP.mpt to obtain a 
payment agreemer.t from a seller 
through any eat of retaliation of 
1 other form of t a on. ~ 
c re asers to promptly reimburse 
agents. Each packer, market agency, 
or dealer who utilizes or employs an 
! agent to purchase livestock for him, I shall. In transactions where such agent 
· uses his own funds to pay for livestock. 
purchased on order, transmit, or deliv-
er to such agent the full amount of 
the purchase price before the close of 
the next business day followln11 re· 
celpt of notification of the payment of 
such purchase price. unless otherwise 
\ 
expressly a1reed between the parties 
before the purchase of the livestock.. 
Any such agreement shall be disclosed 
' In the records of the principal and In 
, the records of any market a11mcf. ~r 
: dealer acting as such a11ent. ·· J 
I <d> The provisions of paragraphs bl 
'<1 l and <cl of this section shall not be 
construed to permit any transact1011 
iprohlblted by I 201.6l<al relating to fl.' 
nanclng by market &11encles sellln11 911 
a commission basis, or by 1201.68 re-; 
tatln11 to flnancln11 pack.era by ·dealers 
or vice versa. 
<Secs. 202, 301, 312, tOI, t2 Stat. Ill. 115, 
161, 168: 1 u.s.c. 112. 208. 213. 221;-. toe. 
as added by aec. 1. 90 Stat. 12!>0; 1 U .S.C. 
228b; 1 CFR 2.11, Ut; t2 F'R 31M12al 
119 FR 028, July 22. 19H. as amended at 29 
FR 1196, Feb. 6. Ifft; 38 FR 2'111, Feb. 10. 
1911: t2 FR t9928, Sept. 28. 19111 
23 
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b-J:s. i.o ob11Un £.t-oo~.-ctr.o .. '• £.he .. un-.a 
due Lhe 1na.-kcf, agency or Jfce1:isee &B 
compensaL1on for tr..s services. 
Ce) Crutodial account& for buvers · 
und3. If the Secretary fJnds that any 
m.-ket agency or Hcen.see ha.s used for 
purPoses of its own any funds received 
tor the purchase of Hvestock or live 
poultry on a commlssJon or agency 
basis, or any other funds which have 
come into Its possession In Its capacity 
as agent or the buyer, such market 
agency or licensee shall thereafter de-
posit any such funds In a separate 
bank account designated as "Custodial 
Account for Buyers' ,Funds," or by a 
similar Identifying designation, which 
account shall be set up under terms 
and conditions with the bank where 
established, to disclose that the de-
positor Is acting as a fiduciary with re-
spect thereto and that the funds In 
the account are trust funds. Such ac-
counts shall be drawn on only for pay-
ment of the purchase price of livestock 
or live poultry purchased on behalf of 
a principal and to obtain therefrom 
the sums due the market agency or li-
censee as compensation for Its ser-
vices, and for such sums as are neces-
sary to pay all legal charges Incurred 
In connection with the purchase of 
livestock or live poultry which the 
market agency or licensee may In Its 
capacity as agent, be required to pay 
for and on behalf of Its principal. 
U> Account. and records. Every 
market agency and licensee shall keep 
such accounts and records as wlll at all 
times disclose the handling or the 
funds In the custodial account re-
ferred to in paragraphs <bl and <e> of 
this section, Including without limita-
tion, such accounts and records as wlll 
at all times disclose the names of the 
consignors and the amount due and 
payable to each from funds In the Cus-
todial Account for Shippers' Proceeds, 
and the names of the principals, from 
whom funds have been received In the 
capacity of buyer for such principals, 
the amount of funds received from 
such principals, and the amount paid 
on behalf of such principals from 
funds In the Custodial Account for 
Buyers' Funds. 
(g) Insured bank.!. The separate cus-
todial accounts referred to In para-
graphs <bl and <e> of this section shall 
APPENDIX ~--page l 
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ratJon. 
( h) Certificates of deposiL Any 
market agency or licensee which has 
established and maintains the sepa-
rate custodial account referred to in 
paragraph (b) of this section may 
Invest, In certificates of deposit Issued 
by the bank In which such account ls 
kept, such portion of the custodial 
funds as will not Impair the market 
agency's or licensee's ability to meet 
Its obligations to Its consignors. Such 
certificates of deposit shall be made 
payable to the market agency or li-
censee in Its fiduciary capacity as 
trustee of the custodial funds. 
[32 FR 20921. Dec. 29, 19871 
ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS 
§ 201.43 Payment and a«ountin1 ror llve-
•tock and Ii•• poultry. 
<a> Market agencies and licensees to 
make prompt accounting and trans-
mittal of net proceeds. Each market 
agency shall, before the close of the ~ 
next business day following the sale of 
any livestock consigned to It for sale, 
transmit or deliver to the consignor or 
shipper of the livestock, or his duly 
authorized a.gent, In the absence of 
any knowledge that any other person, 
or persons. has any Interest In the live-
stock, the net proceeds received from 
the sale and a true written account of 
such sale, showing the number, 
weight, and price of each kind of 
animal sold, the name of the purchas-
er, the dat .. of sale,-the commission, 
I yardage, and other lawful charges, and 
1 such other facts as may be necessary 
to complete the account and show 
1 fully the true nature of the transac-
tion. Each licensee, acting as a broker, 
factor, or commission merchant, shall, 
before the close of the next business 
day following the sale of live poultry 
consigned to it for sale, transmit or de-
liver to the consignor or shipper of the 
live poultry, or his duly authorized 
agent, in the absence of any knowl-
edge that any other person, or per-
ons, has any Interest In the live poul-
ry, the net proceeds received from the a 
ale and a true written account of such ... 
ale showing the number of pounds Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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terO"l.S and condltlons as the pa.rues 
may agree upon. Each ticket shall be 
legibly slgned by the seller a.nd the 
buyer or authorized .-epresentattves 
thereof and when thus signed shall 
constitute the contract of purchase 
and sale. One copy of such ticket shall 
be retained by the seller. On request a 
copy shall be furnished to the buyer. 
A copy shall be transmitted with an 
accounting of the sale to the owner or 
consignor of the live poultry if the 
transaction is one on an agency basis. 
Settlement betw<en seller and buyer 
shall be on the basis of the duly ex-
ecuted and signed tickets required by 
this section unless good cause is shown 
!or settlement on some other basis. 
I 19 FR 4529. July 22. 19541 
f 201.'9 llequlremenla regardln~ acale 
ticketa Hldenclnr wei(hlnr of' 11••-
llOck-
<a> When livestock is wel11hed for 
purpose of purchase or sale. a scale 
ticket shall be issued which shall 
show: < 1 l The name and location of 
the agency performing the weighing 
service; < 2 > the date of the weighin11; 
< 3 > the name of the buyer and seller or 
consignor. or a designation by which 
they may be readily identified; < 4l the 
number of head; <5> kind; <6> actual 
weight of the livestock; and <1> the 
name, Initials, or number of the 
person who weighed the livestock. or if 
required by State law, the signature of 
the weighmaster. Scale tickets issued 
under this section shall be serially 
numbered and sufficient copies ex-
ec!!ted to. prnvlde"!!_lffipy io all Pl'ftJes 
to the transaction. 
· <b)" In instances where the weight 
values are recorded by means of auto-
matic weighing and recording equip-
ment 1irectly on the account of sale or 
other basic record, this record may 
servt' in lieu of a scale ticket. 
<cl Stockyard owners. market agen-
cies, and dealers who own or operate 
livestock scales shall be responsible for 
the accurate weighing of livestock and 
the execution and issuance of scale 
tickets. 
~~~.._;.::-~-......-·..:..:~.._ ..,•;;.2>. • .;.:.: ... ·.~:::,.:.·._'.";,_; ""-:~r~ t'."'::_'.:_ 
ltiD. - 1LIT>.ended: "l USC. ".?;22. 22lHa.\; ,,..,,c 
~ ¥' of Lhe Fo:'de.-a.l Tll"r..dc Comml.:::..::.\on Acl 3 
Stal. '121. 1~ U.S.C. •6lK:)): 3'1 FR 284.6! 
284.'11) 
lJ9 FR 8913. Mar. 1. 19'ltl 
~ 201.50 Records; diapoaation. 
<al Except as otherwise provided I: 
paragraphs (bl and <cl of this sectim 
no stockyard owner, market agenci 
dealer. or licensee shall, without ti• 
consent in writing of the Adminlstr 
tor. destroy or dispose of any book 
records, documents, or papers whi< 
contain, explain, or modify transa. 
tions in his business under the Act. 
<bl Every stockyard owner. mark" 
agency, dealer, or licensee may destrc 
or dispose of the following categorh 
of records after they have been rt 
talned !or a period of 2 full calenda 
years: 
STOCKYARD OWNERS 
All (eed records. 
Dipping and spraying orders. 
Vacclnattn1 and testing orders. 
Orders tor speclal services. . f 
Routlne correspondence. 
Railroad advance char1es. 
ems to commission firms and others. 
Records of shipments by States and ml 
kets. 
Deposit slips. 
Bank statements. 
25 
Cancelled checks and drafts. 
Check stubs. 
Rallroad in-bound records. 
Truck-in receipt records. 
Delivery records. 
Yarding recelpt..s. 
Pass-out and delivery orders. 
Truck shlpplnK orders. 
Railroad shlppln1 orders. 
Scale yardin1 records. 
Scale tickets. 
Scale test reports. 
MARK&'I' AGENCIES 
Scale tickets. 
Bllls from stockyard company. 
Bills (or livestock purchased. 
Gate tickets. 
Routine correspondence. 
Way-bills and truckers tickets. 
Accounts of sales. 
Accounts o( purchases. 
Bills and Invoices to buyer ... 
Deposit slips. 
Bank statements. 
Cancelled checks and drafts. 
Check stubs. 
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Ea•.:t1 market agency and Hcen.see 
shaJJ, µromptJy foJJowing the purchase 
of livestock or Jive poultry on a com-
nus.sion or agency basis. transmU or 
deliver lo lhe person for whose ac-
count such purchase was made, or his 
duly authorized agent, a true written 
account of the purchase showing the 
number. weight, and price of each 
kind of animal purchased. or the 
weight and price of each kind of live 
poultry purchased. the names of the 
persons from whom purchased, the 
date of purchase. the commission and 
other lawful charges. and such other 
facts as may be necessary to complete 
the account and show fully the true 
nature of the transaction. 
[19 FR 4528, July 22. 19541 
f 201.45 Market agenciea and Ucen1ee1 to 
make records available for inspection 
by ownen, conaignon, and purchaaera. 
Each market agency and licensee en-
gaged In the business of selling or 
buying livestock or Jive poultry on a 
commission or agency basis shall, on 
request from an owner, consignor, or 
purchaser, make available copies of 
bills covering charges paid by such 
market agency or licensee for and on 
behalf of the owner. consignor, or pur-
chaser which were deducted from the 
gross proceeds or the sale or livestock 
or Jive poultry or added to the pur-
chase price thereof when accounting 
for the sale or purchase. 
119 FR 4528. July 22. 19541 
I 201.46 Slockyard ownen, markel a1en-
<iea, dealen, and Ileen- lo keep 
dally record. 
<al Each stockyard owner, In addi-
tion lo other necessary records, shall 
make and keep an accurate record or 
the number or head of each class or 
livestock received, shipped, or disposed 
of locally each day. Each market 
agency or dealer buying or sellln1 live-
stock on a commission basis or other-
wise. except packer buyers registered 
as dealers to purchase livestock for 
slaughter only, In addition to other 
necessary records, shall make and 
keep an accurate record of the number 
APPENDIX E--page 2 24 
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e>r o"-h••rwln•• disposed ~I ca.ch lbu,,.ln..,._ 
day. the prlce.s paid or received there-
for. and the charges made tor services. 
Cb) Each Ucensee buying or selHnai 
Hve poultry on a commission basis or 
otherwise, In addition to other nece5~ 
sary records. shall make and keep an 
accurate record of the number of 
pounds of live poultry bought or sold 
each business day, the prices paid or 
received therefor. and lhe charges 
made for services and facilities. 
( 19 FR 4528, July 22. 1954, a.s amended at 24 
FR 3183. Apr. 24, 19&91 
I 201.47 Markel arenclea and licen1ee1 lo 
di1cloae bua.ineu relatJon1hiP9. if any. 
with purchaien. 
No market agency or licensee acting 
as a broker, factor, ::.r commission mer-
chanl shall knowingly sell or dispose 
of consigned llveslock or live poultry 
lo any person In whose business such 
market agency or licensee, or any 
stockholder, owner, ortlcer, or employ-
ee thereof, has a financial Interest, or 
to any· person who has a financial In-
terest In such markel agency or licens-
ee, unless the market agency or licens-
ee discloses on lhe accounts of sales 
Issued to the consignors concerned the 
nature of the relationship exlstln1 be-
tween the market agency or licensee 
and the buyers of the livestock or live 
poultry and then only If lhe livestock 
or live poultry has been offered for 
sale on the open market and the pur-
chaser's bid exceeds that or other bid-
ders. The provisions of this section 
shall not be construed to permit any 
transaction prohibited by H 201-57 and 
201.60 relating to sales or livestock or 
live poultry out of consllOffients to 
owners, officers, agents, or employees 
of market agencies or licensees to 
which the livestock or live poultry was 
consigned. 
119 FR 4529, July 22, 19541 
I 201.48 Sellen or live poullry lo luue 
aalea llcketa al de1lrna1ed marketa. 
With respect to each purchase or 
sale of live poultry by licensees at des-
l1Dated markets a ticket shall be pre-
pared by the seller at the time of sale. 
Each ticket shall show the name of 
the desl1Dated market, the date of the 
• 
I 
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t.he Admlnlst.ra.t..or: .Provjd.ed,. That. t.he 
t..est and t:nspecUon ro.-rns used by t.he 
State or other governmental aaency 
contain aubstantlally the sa.me infor-
mation as that required by the official 
fonn. 
[19 FR 4531, July 22. 1954. u amended at 24 
FR 3183, Apr. 24, 1959; 26 FR 1626. Feb. 24, 
1961; 29 FR 4645, Apr, I. 1964; 32 FR 7700, 
May 28, 19611 
1201.76 Scaleo: repatn., aclJuatmenta, or 
replaeementa afler inopectlon. 
No scale shall be operated or used by 
any stockyard owner, market agency, 
dealer, or licensee unless It has been 
found upon test and Inspection to be 
In a condition to give accurate wel11hta. 
If any repairs, adjustments, or replace-
ment& are made upon such a scale It 
shall not be placed In use until It has 
again been tested and Inspected In ac-
cordance with the re11ulatlons In this 
part. 
(19 PR •D32. July 22, 19H. as amended at 2• 
A,PR llH. Apr. 2•. 19591 
'9't 201.76 Reweirhlnr. 
Stockyard owners, market &11encles, 
dealers, packers, and licensees, or their 
employees, shall reweigh livestock or 
live poultry on request of duly author-
ized representatives of the Secretary. 
m::.~o--::,:r~.=,--.:,:::~:r~:-:e'iJl:s.;'~~~c~~.t 
a.nee w1.t.h lnst.ruct.ton.s of the Admln.l.6-
trat.or and shall submit to the Area 
Supervlsor coplea of reports on at leaat 
two scale tests made durlnK each cal-
endar year. They shall employ only 
competent persons of good character 
and known Integrity to operate such 
scales and shall require such employ-
ees to operate the scales ln accordance 
with Instructions of the Administra-
tor. Any employee found to be operat-
ln11 scales Incorrectly, carelessly, ln 
violation of Instructions or In such a 
manner as to favor or Injure any party 
or agency through Incorrect weighing 
or Incorrect weight recording shall be 
removed from his weighing duties. No 
scale shall be used by any packer In 
weighing livestock or livestock car-
casses for purpose of purchase of live-
stock on a live or dressed weight ba.als 
unless It has been found, upon test 
and Inspection, to be In condition to 
yield accurate weights. If any repairs, 
adjustments, or replacements are 
made of a scale It shall not be used 
until It has been retested and ·found 
accurate. 
<cl All livestock scales shall be 
equipped with a type-registering 
welghbeam, a dial with a mechanical 
dcket printer, or a similar device 
which shall be used for printing or 
stamping the weight values on scale 
12• FR 3164, Apr. 24, 19581 tickets. For each draft of livestock 
• W I hi • lb tha weighed for purpose of purchase or 201.77 e I nr ,or pur- o er n sale a scale ticket shall be Issued show-
purchue or .. 1e. Ing, In addition to the weight of the 
Every stockyard owner, market livestock and the amount of dockage, 
agency, dealer, packer, and licensee If any, the name of the seller, the 
who weighs livestock or live poultry name of the buyer, the species, 
for purposes othrr than purchase or number of head, Initials of weigher, 
sale shall show on the scale tickets or and date of weighing. Scale !.lc!<etsJ 
other records used ln connection with shall be executed at least.mdupllcate, 
such weights the fact that they are one-copyllelng 'supplied to the seller 
not weights for the purpose of pur- pr buyer as- the case may be and. on~ 
chase or sale. copy being retain~<! by the packer. 
124 FR 3184. Apr. 24, 19591 <Secs. 202, 401, n Stat. 161 et seq .. u 
r I amended; 1 U.S.C. 192. 2211 f 201.78 Packer oca ea. 130 FR 16t9. June 12. 1965. as amended at <al Packers owning or operating live- 32 FR 1100. May 26. 19811 stock or monorail scales on which live- Non: The reportlni and record-keeping 
-
stock or livestock carcasses are reQulrements contained herein have been 
weighed for purpose of purchase of approved by the Bureau of Budget In ac· 
livestock In commerce on a live or cordance with the Federal Reports Act of 
dressed weight basis shall Install, 110 .. 
11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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;y ~~ :.,;·;:,:;;Ji;-:1..":-~~:::,.~:!f?!.-
rouMh a..ny corporat.e OT 
to have any owner:snJp 
lnance, or partJcJpate tn 
ent or operation ol auch 
ctton shall not be con· 
It or prohibit any packer 
the servJces of aH or any 
tom feedlot tor the pur-
g lt.s own livestock led tor 
lt.s own slaughter, nor 
t that a packer advances 
feedlot funds normally 
the purchase or compen-
vestock, teed, veterinary 
ther goods or services In 
Ith the feeding of Its own 
r purposes of lt.s own 
deemed to contravene 
No custom feeder shall be 
olate this section by sell-
Y part of 11.s services to 
y receiving necessary live-
services, or funds there-
ckers In connection with 
f packer owned livestock 
s of slaughter by said 
t aeq.l 
ay 11. 19141 
SERVICES 
::;:..:~:-~!:f .. ~.?cF~~... 4i; 
(2<11 FR 3J83. Apr. 24. 1868. aa amended at 20 
FR 1426. Feb. 2•. Uit61: 32 FR 7700. May 26, 
196'11 
f 201.73 &ale operaton to be competenL 
Stockyard owners. market agencies. 
dealers. and licensees shall employ 
only competent persons of good char· 
acter and known Integrity to operate 
scales for weighing livestock or live 
poultry tor the purpose of purchase or 
sale. They shall require such employ-
ees to operate the scales Jn accordance 
with Instructions of the Administra-
tor, copies of which will be furnished 
to each stockyard owner, market 
agency, dealer, or licensee who em-
ploys persons to operate scales used 
for the purposes herein Indicated. 
They also shall require such employ-
ees to "rotate" In their weighing as-
signments at ·stockyards operallng 
three or more scales. Any person 
found to be operating scales Incorrect-
ly, carelessly, In violation of Instruc-
tions, or in such manner as to favor or 
Injure any party or agency through In· .II 
correct weighing or Incorrect weight 
recording shall be removed from hla 
weighing duties. 
119 FR 4531, July 22, 1954, as amended at 24 
FR 3183, Apr. 24, 1959; 28 FR 1828, Feb. 24, 
1881; 32 FR 1100, May 28, 18811 
rate welrhte. f ZOl.74 Scalea; reporlll of tealll and ln-
kyard owner, market 1pec:tlona. 
r, or licensee who weighs Each stockyard owner, market 
live poultry shall Install, a 11ency, dealer, or licensee who welgha 
d operate the scales used livestock or live poultry for purposes 
hlng so as to Insure accu- of purchase or sale, shall furnish re-
. All livestock scales shall ports of tests and Inspections of scales 
with. a type-registering used for such purposes on forms which 
a dial with a mechanical will be furnished by the Director on 
r, or a slmllar device request. The stockyard owner, market 
be used tor printing or agency, dealer, or licensee shall retain 
e weight values on scale one copy of such form when executed, 
shall cause one copy to be retained by 
pt. 20. 19811 the agency conducting the test and In-
spection of the scales, and shall deliver 
a: IHlin1 of. the third copy to the Area Supervisor 
kyard owner, market having charge of the work under the 
r, or licensee who weighs act In the particular area In which the 
live poultry for purposes scales being tested are located. In case 
or sale or who furnishes the test and Inspection of scales as 
ch purposes shall cause herein required are conducted by an lt 
to be tested properly by agency of a State or municipality or 
gencles at suitable Inter- other governmental subdlvl.slon, the 
ance with Instructions of forms ordlnarlly used by such agency 
32 
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.such acknowledgment. 
<b> Purchasing livestock for whkh 
payment ls to be made by a draft 
whJch ts not a check, shall constitute 
purchasine such livestock on credit 
within the meaning of paragraph <al 
of this section. <See also 
I 201.43<bl<l ll, 
<cl The provisions of this section 
shall not be construed to permit any 
transaction prohibited by I 20l.6l<a> 
relating to financing by market a11en-
cles selling on a commission basis, or 
by 1201.68 relating to tlnancln11 pack-
ers by dealers or vice versa. 
(Sec. 401. 42 Stat. 188 11 U.S.C. 221 l; sec. 
409, aa added by sec. 1. 90 Stat. 1250 (1 
U.S.C 228bl; 1 CFR 2.17. 2.54; 42 FR 35825l 
142 FR 49929, Sept. 8, 19111 
PART 203-STATEMENTS OF GENER-
AL POLICY UNDER THE PACKERS 
AND STOCKY AIDS ACT A~ec. ~03.1 Statement of 1eneral policy with re-
spect to lamb buyln1 practlcea. 
203.2 Statement of 1enersl policy with re· 
1pect to the 1lvlne by meat pack.en of 
meat and other 1Ut.a to Government em-
ployeea. 
203.3 Statement with respect to meat 
pack.er salea promotion prol'rama. 
203.4 Statement with respect to the dispo-
sition of certain records made or kept by 
packers. 
203.5 Statement with respect to market 
&l'encles paylnl' the expenses of live· 
&tock buyers. 
203.8 Statement with respect to the pur-
chase of llveatock by packers for export. 
203.1 Statement with respect to meat 
packer sales and purchase contracts. 
203.8 Statement with respect to re1ula· 
lions and practices of •tockyard ownen 
and market &l'encles. 
203.9 Statement with respect to the han· 
dlln1 of custodial funds by llveatoclr. 
market a1encle1 and poultry llcenseea. 
203.10 Statement with respect to Insolven-
cy; definition of current auets and cur-
rent llabllltlea. 
201.11 Statement with respect to vacation 
of rate ord~,. under the PM:lr.en and 
t Stockyards Act. 201.U Statement with respect to provldlnl oervlcea and facllltlea at atoclr.yarda on a 
reaaonable and nondlacrlmlnatory bula. 
43 
~03 13 Sl.a.t.emenl. ""ll.n reap-ec1. \.0 volunl.a.,.-y 
flUns o( .. u.-et.y bonds unde.- t.he Packers 
'"'d St.ockya.rdB Act.. 
2:03.14 St.atement wlth respect t.o advertb-
lnK allowances and other merchandl&ln1 
payment& and services. 
203.15 Trust benefit.a under section 200 o( 
the act. 
203.18 Matllnl' o( <.hecks In payment for 
livestock. purchased for t)auehter, for 
cash and not on credit. 
§ :Ml.l.1 Statement or 1enersl policy wW. 
nopect to laml> bu1ln1 pnc:tlcn. 
!al It has been brought to the atten-
tion or the Packers and Stockyardl 
Administration, United States Depart· 
ment of Agriculture, that packers, 
<tealers. and market agencies subject 
to the provisions of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act, are engaging In cer-
tain practices In connection with the 
purchase and sale or lambs In proml· 
nent lamb producing areas or the 
United States which are Injurious to 
lamb producers. The practices relate 
to the discounting or prices l>Y buyers 
In the purchase of heavy lambs. 
<b> The following methods of buyln1 
lambs are considered to be unratr prac-
tices under the provlsiona of the Pad!· 
ers and Stockyards Act: 
<1 l A buyer llrnltln11 payment for 
lambs to a desljrnated average wel11ht 
and requlrln11 the Jamb producer to 
give any additional wel11ht to lb• 
buyer without. payment. 
<21 A buyer subtracting wel11ht from 
the true and actual wel11ht of the 
lambs. 
<cl The practices In parqraph <bl of 
this section result In mlsleadln11 
market Information and the issuance 
of Incorrect scale tickets, Invoices, and 
other documents relatln11 to the pur· 
chase and sale transaction. It Is be· 
Ueved the provisions of the Packers 
and Stockyards Act, under Title II and 
Title III. prohibit all packers, dealers, 
and market a11encles subject to the 
provisions of the Act from en11&11ln11 In 
these practices. 
<d> In addition, the Packers and 
Stockyardl Administration has re-
ceived complaints from lamb produc-
ers with respect to the practice of 
lamb buyers dlacount1n11 prices paid 
for lambs where the wel11ht of the 
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Ir o~.-alon to bir competent. 
d Jive pouJtry deaJers and 
alJ empJoy only competent 
ood character and known 
operate scales tor welgh-
Jltry tor purposes of pur-
acqulsltlon or settlement 
equlre such employees to 
scales In accordance with 
ions of the Administrator, 
hlch will be furnished by 
tration to each packer and 
dealer and handler. Any 
er, or other person acting 
>yed by any packer or live 
ler or handler found to be 
ales Incorrectly, carelessly, 
of weighing instructions. 
a manner as to favor or 
party through incorrect 
incorrect wei11ht record-
' removed from his wei11h· 
38 Stal. 721. 42 Stal. 168, u 
.c. 222. 15 u.s.c. 46> 
an. 23. 19711 
eirhln1. 
d live poultry dealers and 
their employees, shall 
poultry on request of dulY 
presentatlves of the Sec-
of wel1hlnJ. 
live poultry Is weighed on 
a packer or live poultry 
dler, the 11ross weight 
rmlned on the scale nor-
for such purpose as 
possible after the poultry 
he vehicle. 
8 Stal. 721, 42 Stat. 118, u 
.c. 222. 15 u.s.c. 48) 
• 23. 19711 
rUna and recordkeepln1 re-
the revlatd re1ulatlona have 
by the Office of Manqe-
1et In accordance with the 
Act of 1842. 
• ·-·;.:; ·--~-.~;;·;.~;..,h_:;;.'."""' - ..... ·-~ 
Each packer or Hve pouJt.ry dealer or 
handler shall. bel"ore the cJose of" 6 
busJness days foJJowJna sla~ghter of 
any pouJtry pi.Jrchased, transmit or de-
Hver to the seJJer of such poultry or 
his duJY authorfzed agent the full 
amount of the purchase prjce thereof. 
unless otherwise expressly agreed be-
tween the parties before the purchase 
of the poultry. Any such agreement 
shall be disclosed In such purchaser's 
records and on all accountings or 
other documents Issued by such pur-
chaser relatln11 to the transaction. 
138 FR 4384, Feb. U. 19131 
§ 201.200 Sale of liveotock to a packer on 
credit. 
<a> No packer whose average annual 
purchases of livestock exceed $500,000 
shall purchase livestock on credit, and 
no dealer or market agency acting as 
an agent tor such a packer shall pur-
chase livestock on credit, unless: <1 > 
Before purchasln11 such livestock the 
packer obtains from the seller a wrltA ., 
ten acknowled1J111ent as follows: WJ 
On thls date I am enterlnl' Jnto a written 
&l'reement for the sale of livestock on credit 
to --------, a packer. and I under-
stand that In dolnl' 10 I will have no rl&hta 
under the trust provisions of section 208 of 
the Packers and Stockyarcli Act, 1921. as 
amended <1 U.S.C. 196, Pub. L. 94-UO>. with 
respect to any auch credit aale. The written 
a1reement for such aell1n1 on credit 
Coven a slna:le sale. 
Provides that It wm remain In eflect until 
!date>. 
Provide• that It will remain In eflect until 
canceled In wrltlnl' by either party. 
<Omit the provlalona not applicable.> 
Date -------------------
Slsnature -----------------
<2> such packer retains such ac-
k11owled1J111ent, together with all other 
documenta, If any, settln11 forth the 
terma of such credit sales on which 
the purchaser and seller have agreed, 
and such dealer or market agency re-
talna a copy thereof, In his records for 
such time as la required by any law. or 
by written notlc• served on such 
person by the Administrator. but no& 
leu than two calendar years from th 
date of expiration of the written 
42 
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period ot' t.lme. At. t.he end or such 
specified ttme, t.he accumulated point.a 
were redeemed by persons connected 
with the customer accounts for prizes 
and gifts selected from a gift catalog 
supplied by the sponsoring packer. 
(bl Investigation by the Packers and 
Stockyards Administration has dis· 
closed that sales promotion programs 
of the type In question, which are 
based on the giving of gifts to retail 
food store customer accounts or to the 
employees or agents of such customer 
accounts, constitute a marketing prac· 
Uce under which sellers tend to com-
pete In the sale of their products on 
the basis of Inducements offered to 
their customers In the form of person-
al gifts, rather than on the basis of 
the merits and prices of the competing 
products, and may result In < 1 > the 
lessening of competition by unduly 
hamperlnt1 sales of competing prod-
ucts, and <21 the making or giving of 
undue or unreasonable preferences or 
t:dvantages. <c> It Is the view of the Packers and Stockyards Administration that sales 
promotion programs, which are found 
In fact to produce any of the enumer· 
ated or similar results, constitute vio-
lations of section 202 of the Packers 
and Stockyards Act <1 U.S.C. 192>. and 
that packers subject to the Act should 
voluntarily discontinue sponsoring or 
conducting any such program. In the 
future, If any packer sponsors or con-
ducts a sales promotion program of 
the type In question, consideration will 
be given by the Packers and Stock-
yards Administration to the Issuance 
of a complaint charging the packer 
with violation of section 202 of the 
Act. In the formal administrative pro-
ceeding Initiated by any such com-
plaint, the Judicial Officer of the De· 
partment will determine, after full 
hearing, whether the packer has vio-
lated the Act and should be ordered to 
cease and desist from continuing such 
violation. 
CSeca. 202, t01; t2 Stat. 169; 1 u.s.c. 192, 
1
228) 
121 FR 1125t, Nov. 15. 1962; 21 FR 115t1, 
Nov. 2t, 1962, u amended at 32 FR 1100, 
May 26. 19611 
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---···-- -· -- ·- ---· ~ kep._ b:y P•c ... era. 
(Q.) Sect.ton 4.0l. ol t.he P'll 
St.ockyards Act. CJ U.S.C. 221 
ln part, that every pa.c~er 
such accounts, records, and 
da a.s fully and ~orrectly ¢ 
transactions Involved In· h1' 
Including the true ownersh 
business by stockholdlng or 
This section contains no p1 
to the period of time such r 
to be retained. Apparently 
templated that records 1 
made or kept by a packer ' 
transactions Involved In hi 
should be retained for such 
time as may be necessary 
the Packers and Stockyard 
tratlon a reasonable opportu 
amine such records In conn<· 
Its administration of the Acl 
(bl In the course of cone 
vestlgatlons under the Act, 
ers and Stockyards Division 
that the practice varies amoi 
with respect to the retenti 
for records made or kept t 
transactions Involved In thei 
some packers retain such r 
extended periods of time, w 
packers dispose of their rec 
much shorter periods of Um 
reason the Packers and f 
Administration has formu, 
adopted for the guidance 01 
ers the following statemen1 
Ing Its views as to periods of 
which certain specified recc 
Ing to the purchase or sal 
stock, meat, meat food pro< 
stock products In unmar 
form, poultry or poultry 11r,i 
be disposed of. 
cc> It Is the view of the p, 
Stockyards Administration 
forth In paragraphs cc> Cll,, 
of this section, are reason• 
of time after which packer. 
the provisions of th~ 
Stockyards Act. ma} cl: 
records specified ir. '-
graphs. The Packers an J 
Administration recognize., 
packers do not find i• "' 
make or keep all such recott 
to comply with the provlsio, 
of the Act. On the other 
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of Jambs at $21. per hundredweight.. .stat.e or t"oreJST>. commerce any Kitt. 
provided that the average weJght ls gfven wJth any Intent or purpose what-
not Jn excess ot 105 pounds, but re- soever <21 U.S.C. 90>. Under the Feder-
quJres a discount of the $21 per hun- al meat grading regulations, the giving 
dredweJght price at the rate of 25 or attempting to give by a packer of 
cents for each pound in excess of the anything of vaJue t.o any employee of 
105 pounds. ThJs type of buying prac- the Department authorized to per-
tJce results Jn the final sales price form any function under such regula-
being made subject to a contingency tlons is a basis for the withdrawal or 
based upon average weight. Where the Federal meat grading service <7 CFR 
weight is above the specified weight, 53.13>. The receiving by an employee 
the purchase price is not definite at of the Department or any gift from 
the time the agreement to purchase is any person for whom grading, lnspec-
entered Into, the discount to be ap- tlon, or other service work Is per-
plied is unknown until the lambs are formed Is specifically prohibited by 
weighed. and the final sales price, Departmental regulations. 
upon which payment to the lamb pro· <cl Upon the basis of para11raphs <al 
ducer ts based. can only be ascertained and <bl of this section, It is the view of 
by weighing the lambs to the buyer. It the Department that It Is an unfair 
ts believed that this buying practice and deceptive practice In violation of 
should be discontinued. This method section 202<a> of the Packers and 
of buying lends Itself to unfair and de- Stockyards Act <7 U.S.C. 192<all for 
ceptlve practices under the Act since It any person subject to the provisions of 
has the tendency to mislead the pro- Title II or said Act to give or offer to 
ducer with respect to the final sales give meat, money, or anything of value 
price and can be used by a buyer to to any Government employee who per-
force a producer to take an unwarrant- forms Inspection, grading, reporting.I> 
ed discount. or regulatory duties directly relating 
to the purchase or sale or livestock or ii'~cc.4~~~~~'i. ~2 c~\m116:; 72 Stat. 1750· 7 the preparation or distribution of 
124 FR 4210. May 26, 1959, as amended at 29 meats, meat food products, livestock 
FR 46•5. Apr. l, 1964; 32 FR 7700, May 26, products In unmanufactured form, 
19671 poultry or poultry products. 
§ 203.2 Statement or 1eneral policy with 
respect to the giving by meat packen 
or meat and other 1irt1 to Government 
employees. 
<al In recent months, the Depart· 
ment has received information, con-
firmed by investigation, that a number 
or packers subject to the Packers and 
Stockyards Act have made gifts of 
meat to Government employees re· 
SiJOnsible tor conducting service activi-
ties of the Department. Such gifts 
have the Implications of fraud. even if 
not made specifically for the purpose 
or influencing these employees In the 
performance of their duties. 
<b> It Is a violation of the Meat In· 
spection Act for any person, firm, or 
corporation to give to any employee of 
the Department performing duties 
under such act anything of value with 
intent to Influence such employee In 
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<Sec. 407, 42 Stat. 169; 7 U.S.C. 228; 9 CFR 
201.3) 
126 FR no. Jan. 25, 1961; 29 FR •oa1. Mar. 
28. 19641 
§ 203.3 Statement with respect lo meal 
packer sales promotion programa. 
<al During the past several years. a 
number or packers subject to the 
Packers and Stockyards Act, 192J, as 
amended <7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), have 
sponsored meat and meat food product 
sales promotion programs under 
which valuable gifts ranging from arti-
cles of clothing to automobiles and 
outboard boats and motors have been 
offered and given to their retail food 
store customer accounts and to the 
employees of such customer accounts. 
Many of the promotion pro11rams In 
question have been based upon a IJ 
"point system" whereby so-called 
"participating customer accounts" 
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such a. check; or for ot.he.- res.sons 
such a seller may prefer that such a 
purchaser make payment by maUang a 
check within the Ume llmit as pre-
scribed in sectJon 409<a> of the Act. In 
cases when the seller does not intend 
to be present, he may use the follow-
ing form of notl!lcatlon to the pur-
chaser: 
I do not tntend to be present at the point 
ot transfer of possession of livestock sold by 
me to <name of packer, market agency, or 
dealer) tor the purpose of recelvinK a check 
In payment for such Uvestock. 
I hereby direct <name of packer, market 
aeency, or dealer) to make payment tor live-
stock purchased fl-om me, by mallln111 a 
check for the full amount of the purchase 
price before the close of the next business 
day following the purchase of livestock and 
transfer of possession thereof or, in the cue 
of a purchase on a "carcass" or "arade and 
yl~ld" ba.sls, not later than the close of the 
first business day followln111 determination 
of the purchase price. 
-This does not constitute an extension of 
c 
61 
If the seller. ror reasons other than 
not belng present to receh.!e payment. 
prefers to have the packer. market 
agency. or dealer make payment by 
malling a check within the time limit 
as provided In section 409(a), he may 
use the above form but st.ul!ld not In-
clude the statement In the first sen-
tence that he does not Intend to be 
present. 
(b) The Packers and Stockyards Ad-
ministration believes that such an 
agreement would not constitute an ex-
tension of credit within the meaning 
of section 206 of the Act because It 
would not give the purchaser any 
more time to Issue a check than ls pro-
vided In section 409<a>. 
<Sec. tOl, 42 Slat. 188 17 U.S.C 221); sec. 407, 
42 Stat. 180 11 U.S.C. 228>; sec. 400, as added 
~Y sec. 1, 90 Slat. 1250 ,7 U.S.C. 228bl; 1 
CFR 2.11. 2.M; U FR 35825> 
IU FR 40020, Sept. 28, 19711 
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II Cu.1torne..-·.1 l1abi/1i11. A cual.omer. eub- (38 FR :U173. Au11. 6.10731 
Ject to tho:- Packers JUld St.ockya.rd.s Act. who 
knows. or- should know. that he la receJvtne 
payment.s or servJces which a.re nol avail&· 
ble on proportlonaJJy eQuaJ tenna to hl.s 
competitors en11aged 1n lhe resaJe ol the 
i;ame packer"!> products may be In vlolatJon 
ot the provtslons ot the Act. Also, customent 
<subject lo lhe Packers and Stockyardii Act> 
that make unauthorized deductions from 
;>Lirchase Invoices for alleged advertlslns or 
other promotional allowances may be pro-
ct>eded agalnst under the provisions of the 
Act. 
Example l: A customer subject to the Act 
should not Induce or receive an allowance In 
excess of that ortered In the packer's adver-
tislrur plan by bllllnK the packer at "vendor 
rates" or for any other a.mount In excess of 
that authorized In the packer's promotion 
proitram. 
12. Muting com~tilion. A packer chanred 
with discrlminallon under the provisions of 
lhe Packen and Stockyards Act may defend 
hls aclloOli by showJns that the payments 
were made or the services were furnished In 
KQOd faith to meet equally high payments 
made by a competln1 packer to the parUcu-
lar customer. or to meet equivalent services 
furnished by a competlna pa.cker to the par-
Ucular customer. Thia defense. however, la 
subJect t.o Important limitations. For In-
stance, It ls lnsurticlent t.o defend solely on 
the basis that competition Jn a particular 
market ls very keen, requlrin1 that special 
Mllowances be 1tven to some customer& lf a 
packer la "lo be competitive." 
13. Coal Jwl\licalion. It ta no defense to a 
charae of unlawful discrimination In the 
payn1ent of an allowance or the furnlshln1 
of a 1ervlce for a packer to show that such 
payment or service could be Justlfled 
throu1h savlnKs In the cost of manufacture. 
&ale. or dellvery. 
The fore1oln1 are ruldellnes which set 
forth the seneral views of the Packen and 
Stockyards Admlnlatratlon re1ardlnK adver-
tlslnK allowancCa and other merchandlslna 
payment.a and aervlcea. In a particular situa-
tion In which the Administrator believes 
that the Act haa been violated In connection 
with such activities, a complaint may be 
Issued lnstltullnK a formal administrative 
proceedln1 under the Act. In such a pro-
ccedln1. the Adrnlnlst.rallve Law Judie or 
the Judicial O!llcer of the Department wlll 
determine, after opportunity for full hear-
lnK. whether the packer bu In fact violated 
the Packers and Stockyarcla Act and should 
be ordered lo ceue and dealat from continu-
ing: such violation. 
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§ 203.15 Tr-ual bendlU und~r •ecUon 206 
of the Act.. 
<a> Within the times specified under 
section 206<bl of the Act, the seller, to 
preserve his Interest In the statutory 
trust, must give written notice to the 
packer and file such notice with the 
Secretary. One o! the ways to satisfy 
the notification requirement under 
this provision ls to make certain that 
notice Is given to the packer within 
the prescribed time by letter, mall· 
gram, or telegram stating: 
(I) Notification to preserve trust 
benefits; 
<2> Identification of packer; 
<3> Identification o! seller; 
< 4) Date o! the transaction; 
< 5) Date o! seller's receipt o! notice 
that payment Instrument has been dis· 
honored <If applicable>; and 
<6> Amount of money due; 
and to make certain that a copy • 
such letter, mallgram, or telegram 
filed with a P&SA Area Office or wit 
P&SA, USDA, Washington, D.C. 
20250, within the prescribed time. 
<b> While the above Information ts 
desirable, any written notice which In· 
forms the packer and the Secretary 
that the packer has failed to pay for 
livestock ls sufficient to meet the 
above-mentioned statutory require· 
ment If It ts given within the pre· 
scribed time. 
<Sec. tot, 42 Stat. 188, <1 u.s.c. 221>: sec. 
401, 42 Stat. 169, <1 U.S.C 228>: sec. 409, aa 
added by aec. 1, 90 Stal. 1250, (1 U.S.C 
228bl; 1 CFR U1, 2.54; 42 FR 35625) 
I 42 FR 49929, Sept. 28, 19111 
I 203.16 Malling of checko In payment (or 
11 ......... purchued ror 1laushler. for 
cuh and not on crediL 
<al The Packers and Stockyards Ad· 
ministration recognizes that one who 
60 
sells livestock to a packer, market 
agency, or dealer, who ts purchasing 
for slaughter, may not Intend to be 
present at the point of transfer of po. 
session of the livestock, to receive pa ' 
ment, at the time a check In paymen 
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